Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind

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1 That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned

Our sympathy with sorrow, though not more real, has been more taken notice of than our sympathy with joy. The word sympathy, in its most proper and primitive signification, denotes our fellow-feeling with the sufferings, not that with the enjoyments, of others. A late ingenious and subtle philosopher thought it necessary to prove, by arguments, that we had a real sympathy with joy, and that congratulation was a principle of human nature. Nobody, I believe, ever thought it necessary to prove that compassion was such.

First of all, our sympathy with sorrow is, in some sense, more universal than that with joy. Though sorrow is excessive, we may still have some fellow-feeling with it. What we feel does not, indeed, in this case, amount to that complete sympathy, to that perfect harmony and correspondence of sentiments, which constitutes approbation. We do not weep, and exclaim, and lament, with the sufferer. We are sensible, on the contrary, of his weakness and of the extravagance of his passion, and yet often feel a very sensible concern upon his account. But if we do not entirely enter into, and go along with, the joy of another, we have no sort of regard or fellow feeling for it. The man who skips and dances about with that intemperate and senseless joy

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which we cannot accompany him in, is the object of our contempt and indignation.

Pain besides, whether of mind or body, is a more pungent sensation than pleasure, and our sympathy with pain, though it falls greatly short of what is naturally felt by the sufferer, is generally a more lively and distinct perception than our sympathy with pleasure, though this last often approaches more nearly, as I shall show immediately, to the natural vivacity of the original passion.

Over and above all this, we often struggle to keep down our sympathy with the sorrow of others. Whenever we are not under the observation of the sufferer, we endeavor, for our own sake, to suppress it as much as we can, and we are not always successful. The opposition which we make to it, and the reluctance with which we yield to it, necessarily oblige us to take more particular notice of it. But we never have occasion to make this opposition to our sympathy with joy. If there is any envy in the case, we never feel the least propensity towards it; and if there is none, we give way to it without any reluctance. On the contrary, as we are always ashamed of our own envy, we often pretend, and sometimes really wish to sympathize with the joy of others, when by that disagreeable sentiment we are disqualified from doing so. We are glad, we say, on account of our neighbor’s good fortune, when in our hearts, perhaps, we are really sorry. We often feel a sympathy with sorrow when we would wish to be rid of it; and we often miss that with joy when we would be glad to have it. The obvious observation, therefore, which it naturally falls in our way to make, is, that our propensity to sympathize with sorrow must be very strong, and our inclination to sympathize with joy very weak.

Notwithstanding this prejudice, however, I will venture to affirm, that, when there is no envy in the case, our propensity to sympathize with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathize with sorrow; and that our fellow-feeling for the agreeable emotion approaches much more nearly to the vivacity of what is naturally felt by the persons principally concerned, than that which we conceive for the painful one.

We have some indulgence for that excessive grief which we cannot entirely go along with. We know what a prodigious effort is requisite before the sufferer can bring down his emotions to complete harmony and concord with those of the spectator. Though he fails, therefore, we easily pardon him. But we have no such indulgence for the intemperance of joy; because we are not conscious that any such vast effort is requisite to bring it down to what we can entirely enter into. The man who, under the greatest calamities, can command his sorrow, seems worthy of the highest admiration; but he who, in the fulness of prosperity, can in the same manner master his joy, seems hardly to deserve any praise. We are sensible that there is a much
wider interval in the one case than in the other, between what is naturally felt by
the person principally concerned, and what the spectator can entirely go along with.

What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of
debt, and has a clear conscience? To one in this situation, all accessions of fortune
may properly be said to be superfluous; and if he is much elevated on account of
them, it must be the effect of the most frivolous levity. This situation, however, may
very well be called the natural and ordinary state of mankind. Notwithstanding the
present misery and depravity of the world, so justly lamented, this really is the state
of the greater part of men. The greater part of men, therefore, cannot find any great
difficulty in elevating themselves to all the joy which any accession to this situation
can well excite in their companion.

But though little can be added to this state, much may be taken from it. Though
between this condition and the highest pitch of human prosperity, the interval is
but a trifle; between it and the lowest depth of misery the distance is immense and
prodigious. Adversity, on this account, necessarily depresses the mind of the sufferer
much more below its natural state, than prosperity can elevate him above it. The
spectator, therefore, must find it much more difficult to sympathize entirely, and keep
perfect time, with his sorrow, than thoroughly to enter into his joy, and must depart
much further from his own natural and ordinary temper of mind in the one case than
in the other. It is on this account, that though our sympathy with sorrow is often a
more pungent sensation than our sympathy with joy, it always falls much more short
of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned.

It is agreeable to sympathize with joy; and wherever envy does not oppose it, our
heart abandons itself with satisfaction to the highest transports of that delightful
sentiment. But it is painful to go along with grief, and we always enter into it with
reluctance.* When we attend to the representation of a tragedy, we struggle against
that sympathetic sorrow which the entertainment inspires as long as we can, and we
give way to it at last only when we can no longer avoid it; we even then endeavor to
cover our concern from the company. If we shed any tears, we carefully conceal them,
and are afraid, lest the spectators, not entering into this excessive tenderness, should
regard it as effeminacy and weakness. The wretch whose misfortunes call upon our
compassion feels with what reluctance we are likely to enter into his sorrow, and
therefore proposes his grief to us with fear and hesitation: he even smother the
half of it, and is ashamed, upon account of this hard-heartedness of mankind, to
give vent to the fulness of his affliction. It is otherwise with the man who riots in
joy and success. Wherever envy does not interest us against him, he expects our
completest sympathy. He does not fear, therefore, to announce himself with shouts
of exultation, in full confidence that we are heartily disposed to go along with him.
Why should we be more ashamed to weep than to laugh before company? We may often have as real occasion to do the one as to do the other; but we always feel that the spectators are more likely to go along with us in the agreeable, than in the painful emotion. It is always miserable to complain, even when we are oppressed by the most dreadful calamities. But the triumph of victory is not always ungraceful. Prudence, indeed, would often advise us to bear our prosperity with more moderation; because prudence would teach us to avoid that envy which this very triumph is, more than any thing, apt to excite.

How hearty are the acclamations of the mob, who never bear any envy to their superiors, at a triumph or a public entry? And how sedate and moderate is commonly their grief at an execution? Our sorrow at a funeral generally amounts to no more than an affected gravity; but our mirth at a christening or a marriage, is always from the heart, and without any affectation. Upon these, and all such joyous occasions, our satisfaction, though not so durable, is often as lively as that of the persons principally concerned. Whenever we cordially congratulate our friends, which, however, to the disgrace of human nature, we do but seldom, their joy literally becomes our joy: we are, for the moment, as happy as they are: our heart swells and overflows with real pleasure: joy and complacency sparkle from our eyes, and animate every feature of our countenance, and every gesture of our body.

But on the contrary, when we condole with our friends in their afflictions, how little do we feel, in comparison of what they feel? We sit down by them, we look at them, and while they relate to us the circumstances of their misfortune, we listen to them with gravity and attention. But while their narration is every moment interrupted by those natural bursts of passion which often seem almost to choke them in the midst of it; how far are the languid emotions of our hearts from keeping time to the transports of theirs? We may be sensible, at the same time, that their passion is natural, and no greater than what we ourselves might feel upon the like occasion. We may even inwardly reproach ourselves with our own want of sensibility, and perhaps, on that account, work ourselves up into an artificial sympathy, which however, when it is raised, is always the slightest and most transitory imaginable; and generally, as soon as we have left the room, vanishes, and is gone for ever. Nature, it seems, when she loaded us with our own sorrows, thought they were enough, and therefore did not command us to take any further share in those of others, than what was necessary to prompt us to relieve them.

It is on account of this dull sensibility to the afflictions of others, that magnanimity amidst great distress appears always so divinely graceful. His behavior is genteel and agreeable who can maintain his cheerfulness amidst a number of frivolous disasters. But he appears to be more than mortal who can support in the same manner
the most dreadful calamities. We feel what an immense effort is requisite to silence those violent emotions which naturally agitate and distract those in his situation. We are amazed to find that he can command himself so entirely. His firmness at the same time, perfectly [46] coincides with our insensibility. He makes no demand upon us for that more exquisite degree of sensibility which we find, and which we are mortified to find, that we do not possess. There is the most perfect correspondence between his sentiments and ours, and on that account the most perfect propriety in his behavior. It is a propriety too, which, from our experience of the usual weakness of human nature, we could not reasonably have expected he should be able to maintain. We wonder with surprise and astonishment at that strength of mind which is capable of so noble and generous an effort. The sentiment of complete sympathy and approbation, mixed and animated with wonder and surprise, constitutes what is properly called admiration, as has already been more than once take notice of. Cato, surrounded on all sides by his enemies, unable to resist them, disdaining to submit to them, and reduced, by the proud maxims of that age, to the necessity of destroying himself; yet never shrinking from his misfortunes, never supplicating with the lamentable voice of wretchedness, those miserable sympathetic tears which we are always so unwilling to give; but on the contrary, arming himself with manly fortitude, and the moment before he executes his fatal resolution, giving, with his usual tranquillity, all necessary orders for the safety of his friends; appears to Seneca, that great preacher of insensibility, a spectacle which even the gods themselves might behold with pleasure and admiration.

Whenever we meet, in common life, with any examples of such heroic magnanimity, we are always extremely affected. We are more apt to weep and shed tears for such as, in this manner, seem to feel nothing for themselves, than for those who give way to all the weakness of sorrow; and in this particular case, the sympathetic grief of the spectator appears to go beyond the original passion in the person principally concerned. The friends of Socrates all wept when he drank the last potion, while he himself expressed the gayest and most cheerful tranquillity. Upon all such occasions the spectator makes no effort, and has no occasion to make any, in order to conquer his sympathetic sorrow. He is under no fear that it will transport him to any thing that is extravagant and improper; he is rather pleased with the sensibility of his own heart, and gives way to it with complacence and self-approbation. He gladly indulges, therefore, the most melancholy views which can naturally occur to him, concerning the calamity of his friend, for whom, perhaps, he never felt so exquisitely before, the tender and tearful passion of love. But it is quite otherwise with the person principally concerned. He is obliged, as much as possible, to turn away his eyes from whatever is either naturally terrible or disagreeable in his situation. Too serious
an attention to those circumstances, he fears, might make so violent an impression
upon him, that he could no longer keep within the bounds of moderation, or render
himself the object of the complete sympathy and approbation of the spectators. He
fixes his thoughts, therefore, upon those only which are agreeable, the applause and
admiration which he is about to deserve by the heroic magnanimity of his behavior.
To feel that he is capable of so noble and generous an effort, to feel that in this
dreadful situation he can still act as he would desire to act, animates and transports
him with joy, and enables him to support that triumphant gaiety which seems to
exult in the victory he thus gains over his misfortunes.

On the contrary, he always appears, in some measure, mean and despicable, who
is sunk in sorrow and dejection upon account of any calamity of his own. We cannot
bring ourselves to feel for him what he feels for himself, and what, perhaps, we should
feel for ourselves if in his situation: we, therefore, despise him; unjustly perhaps, if
any sentiment could be regarded as unjust, to which we are by nature irresistibly
determined. The weakness of sorrow never appears in any respect agreeable, except
when it arises from what we feel for ourselves. A son, upon the death of an indulgent
and respectable father, may give way to it without much blame. His sorrow is chiefly
founded upon a sort of sympathy with his departed parent; and we readily enter into
his humane emotion. But if he should indulge the same weakness upon account of
any misfortune which affected himself only, he would no longer meet with any such
indulgence. If he should be reduced to beggary and ruin, if he should be exposed to
the most dreadful dangers, if he should even be led out to a public execution, and
there shed one single tear upon the scaffold, he would disgrace himself for ever in
the opinion of all the gallant and generous part of mankind. Their compassion for
him, however, would be very strong, and very sincere; but as it would still fall short
of this excessive weakness, they would have no pardon for the man who could thus
expose himself in the eyes of the world. His behavior would affect them with shame
rather than with sorrow; and the dishonor which he had thus brought upon himself
would appear to them the most lamentable circumstance in his misfortune. How did
it disgrace the memory of the intrepid Duke of Biron, who had so often braved death
in the field, that he wept upon the scaffold, when he beheld the state to which he
was fallen, and remembered the favor and the glory from which his own rashness had
so unfortunately thrown him?

2 Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks

It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than
with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty. Nothing
is so mortifying as to be obliged to expose our distress to the view of the public, and
to feel, that though our situation is open to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal
conceives for us the half of what we suffer. Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to
the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what
purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of avarice and
ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and pre-eminence? Is it to supply the
necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest laborer can supply them. We see
that they can afford him food and clothing, the comfort of a house and of a family.
If we examine his economy with rigor, we should find that he spends a great part
of them upon conveniences, which may be regarded as superfluities, and that, upon
extraordinary occasions, he can give something even to vanity and distinction. What
then is the cause of our aversion to his situation, and why should those who have
been educated in the higher ranks of life, regard it as worse than death, to be reduced
to live, even without labour, upon the same simple fare with him, to dwell under
the same lowly roof, and to be clothed in the same humble attire? Do they imagine
that their stomach is better or their sleep sounder in a palace than in a cottage?
The contrary has been so often observed, and, indeed, is so very obvious, though it
had never been observed, that there is nobody ignorant of it. From whence, then
arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, and what
are the advantages which we propose by the great purpose of human life which we
call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice
of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we
can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure, which
interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the object
of attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels
that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind
are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which the
advantages of his situation so readily inspire him. At the thought of this, his heart
seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his wealth upon this
account, than for all the other advantages it procures him. The poor man, on the
contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight
of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any
fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is mortified upon both
accounts; for though to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, are things entirely
different, yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honor and approbation, to
feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and
disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature. The poor man goes out and
comes in unheeded, and when in the midst of a crowd is in the same obscurity as if
shut up in his own hovel. Those humble cares and painful attentions which occupy those in his situation, afford no amusement to the dissipated and the gay. They turn away their eyes from him, if the extremity of his distress forces them to look at him, it is only to spurn so disagreeable an object from among them. The fortunate and the proud wonder at the insolence of human wretchedness, that it should dare to present itself before them, and with the loathsome aspect of its misery presume to disturb the serenity of their happiness. The man of rank and distinction, on the contrary, is observed by all the world. Every body is eager to look at him, and to conceive, at least by sympathy, that joy and exultation with which his circumstances naturally inspire him. His actions are the objects of the public care. Scarce a word, scarce a gesture, can fall from him that is altogether neglected. In a great assembly he is the person upon whom all direct their eyes; it is upon him that their passions seem to wait with expectation, in order to receive that movement and direction which he shall impress upon them; and if his behavior is not altogether absurd, he has, every moment, an opportunity of interesting mankind, and of rendering himself the object of the observation and fellow feeling of every body about him. It is this, which, notwithstanding the restraint it imposes, notwithstanding the loss of liberty with which it is attended, renders greatness the object of envy, and compensates, in the opinion of mankind, all that toil, all that anxiety, all those mortifications which must be undergone in the pursuit of it; and what is of yet more consequence, all that leisure, all that ease, all that careless security, which are forfeited for ever by the acquisition.

When we consider the condition of the great, in those delusive colors in which the imagination is apt to paint it, it seems to be almost the abstract idea of a perfect and happy state. It is the very state which, in all our waking dreams and idle reveries, we had sketched out to ourselves as the final object of our desires. We feel, therefore, a peculiar sympathy with the satisfaction of those who are in it. We favor all their inclinations, and forward all their wishes. What pity, we think, that any thing should spoil and corrupt so agreeable a situation. We could even wish them immortal; and it seems hard to us, that death should at last put an end to such perfect enjoyment. It is cruel, we think, in Nature to compel them from their exalted stations to that humble, but hospitable home, which she has provided for all her children. Great king, live for ever! is the compliment which, after the manner of eastern adulation, we should readily make them, if experience did not teach us its absurdity. Every calamity that befalls them, every injury that is done them, excites in the breast of the spectator ten times more compassion and resentment than he would have felt, had the same things happened to other men. It is the misfortune of kings only which afford the proper subjects for tragedy. They resemble in this respect, the misfortunes of lovers.
Those two situations are the chief which interest us upon the theatre; because, in
spite of all that reason and experience can tell us to the contrary, the prejudices of
the imagination attach to these two states a happiness superior to any other. To
disturb, or to put an end to such perfect enjoyment, seems to be the most atrocious
of all injuries. The traitor who conspires against the life of his monarch, is thought
a greater monster than any other murderer. All the innocent blood that was shed in
the civil wars provoked less indignation than the death of Charles I. A stranger to
human nature, who saw the indifference of men about the misery of their inferiors,
and the regret and indignation which they feel for the misfortunes and sufferings of
those above them, would be apt to imagine, that pain must be more agonizing, and
the convulsions of death more terrible to persons of higher rank, than they are to
those of meaner stations.

Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich
and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Our
obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the
advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from
their goodwill. Their benefits can extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest
almost every body. We are eager to assist them in completing a system of happiness
that approaches so near to perfection; and we desire to serve them for their own
sake, without any recompense but the vanity or the honor of obliging them. Neither
is our deference to the inclinations founded chiefly, or altogether, upon a regard to
the utility of such submission, and to the order of society, which is best supported
by it. Even when the order of society seems to require that we should oppose them,
we can hardly bring ourselves to do it. That kings are servants of the people, to be
obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public conveniency may require, is the
doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine of nature. Nature would
teach us to submit to them for their own sake, to tremble and bow down before
their exalted station, to regard their smile as a reward sufficient to compensate any
services, and to dread their displeasure, though no other evil were to follow from it, as
the severest of all mortifications. To treat them in any respect as men, to reason and
dispute with them upon ordinary occasions, requires such resolution, that there are
few men whose magnanimity can support them in it, unless they are likewise assisted
by similarity and acquaintance. The strongest motives, the most furious passions,
fear, hatred, and resentment, are scarce sufficient to balance this natural disposition
to respect them: and their conduct must, either justly or unjustly, have excited the
highest degree of those passions, before the bulk of the people can be brought to
oppose them with violence, or to desire to see them either punished or deposed.
Even when the people have been brought this length, they are apt to relent every
moment, and easily relapse into their habitual state of deference to those whom they have been accustomed to look upon as their natural superiors. They cannot stand the mortification of their monarch. Compassion soon takes the place of resentment, they forget all past provocations, their old principles of loyalty revive, and they run to re-establish the ruined authority of their old masters, with the same violence with which they had opposed it. The death of Charles I. brought about the restoration of the royal family. Compassion for James II., when he was seized by the populace in making his escape on ship-board, had almost prevented the Revolution, and made it go on more heavily than before.

Do the great seem insensible of the easy price at which they may acquire the public admiration; or do they seem to imagine that to them, as to other men, it must be the purchase either of sweat or of blood? By what important accomplishments is the young nobleman instructed to support the dignity of his rank, and to render himself worthy of that superiority over his fellow citizens, to which the virtue of his ancestors had raised them: Is it by knowledge, by industry, by patience, by self-denial, or by virtue of any kind? As all his words, as all his motions are attended to, he learns an habitual regard to every circumstance of ordinary behavior, and studies to perform all those small duties with the most exact propriety. As he is conscious how much he is observed, and how much mankind are disposed to favor all his inclinations, he acts, upon the most indifferent occasions, with that freedom and elevation which the thought of this naturally inspires. His air, his manner, his deportment, all mark that elegant and graceful sense of his own superiority, which those who are born to inferior stations can hardly ever arrive at. These are the arts by which he proposes to make mankind more easily submit to his authority, and to govern their inclinations according to his own pleasure: and in this he is seldom disappointed. These arts, supported by rank and pre-eminence, are, upon ordinary occasions, sufficient to govern the world. Lewis XIV. during the greater part of his reign, was regarded, not only in France, but over all Europe, as the most perfect model of a great prince. But what were the talents and virtues by which he acquired this great reputation? Was it by the scrupulous and inflexible justice of all his undertakings, by the immense dangers and difficulties with which they were attended, or by the unwearied and unrelenting application with which he pursued them? Was it by his extensive knowledge, by his exquisite judgment, or by his heroic valour? It was by none of these qualities. But he was, first of all, the most powerful prince in Europe, and consequently held the highest rank among kings; and then says his historian, ‘he surpassed all his courtiers in the gracefulness of his shape, and the majestic beauty of his features. The sound of his voice, noble and affecting, gained those hearts which his presence intimidated. He had a step and a deportment
which could suit only him and his rank, and which would have been ridiculous in any other person. The embarrassment which he occasioned to those who spoke to him, flattered that secret satisfaction with which he felt his own superiority. The old officer, who was confounded and faltered in asking him a favor, and not being able to conclude his discourse, said to him: “Sir, your majesty, I hope, will believe that I do not tremble thus before your enemies:” had no difficulty to obtain what he demanded. ’These frivolous accomplishments, supported by his rank, and, no doubt too, by a degree of other talents and virtues, which seems, however, not to have been much above mediocrity, established this prince in the esteem of his own age, and have drawn, even from posterity, a good deal of respect for his memory. Compared with these, in his own times, and in his own presence, no other virtue, it seems, appeared to have any merit. Knowledge, industry, valour, and beneficence trembled, were abashed, and lost all dignity before them.

But it is not by accomplishments of this kind, that the man of inferior rank must hope to distinguish himself. Politeness is so much the virtue of the great, that it will do little honor to any body but themselves. The coxcomb, who imitates their manner, and affects to be eminent by the superior propriety of his ordinary behavior, is rewarded with a double share of contempt for his folly and presumption. Why should the man, whom nobody thinks it worth while to look at, be very anxious about the manner in which he holds up his head, or disposes of his arms while he walks through a room? He is occupied surely with a very superfluous attention, and with an attention too that marks a sense of his own importance, which no other mortal can go along with. The most perfect modesty and plainness, joined to as much negligence as is consistent with the respect due to the company, ought to be the chief characteristics of the behavior of a private man. If ever he hopes to distinguish himself, it must be by more important virtues. He must acquire dependants to balance the dependants of the great, and he has no other fund to pay them from, but the labour of his body and the activity of his mind. He must cultivate these therefore: he must acquire superior knowledge in his profession and superior industry in the exercise of it. He must be patient in labour, resolute in danger, and firm in distress. These talents he must bring into public view, by the difficulty, importance, and at the same time, good judgment of his undertakings, and by the severe and unrelenting application, with which he pursues them. Probity and prudence, generosity and frankness, must characterize his behavior upon all ordinary occasions; and he must, at the same time, be forward to engage in all those situations, in which it requires the greatest talents and virtues to act with propriety, but in which the greatest applause is to be acquired by those who can acquit themselves with honor. With what impatience does the man of spirit and ambition, who is depressed by his situation, look round
for some great opportunity to distinguish himself? No circumstances, which can afford this, appear to him undesirable. He even looks forward with satisfaction to the prospect of foreign war or civil dissension; and, with secret transport and delight, sees through all the confusion and bloodshed which attend them, the probability of those wished-for occasions presenting themselves, in which he may draw upon himself the attention and admiration of mankind. The man of rank and distinction, on the contrary, whose whole glory consists in the propriety of his ordinary behavior, who is contented with the humble renown which this can afford him, and has no talents to acquire any other, is unwilling to embarrass himself with what can be attended either with difficulty or distress. To figure at a ball is his great triumph, and to succeed in an intrigue of gallantry, his highest exploit. He has an aversion to all public confusions, not from the love of mankind, for the great never look upon their inferiors as their fellow-creatures; nor yet from want of courage, for in that he is seldom defective; but from a consciousness that he possesses none of the virtues which are required in such situations, and that the public attention will certainly be drawn away from him by others. He may be willing to expose himself to some little danger, and to make a campaign when it happens to be the fashion. But he shudders with horror at the thought of any situation which demands the continual and long exertion of patience, industry, fortitude, and application of thought. These virtues are hardly ever to be met with in men who are born to those high stations. In all governments, accordingly, even in monarchies, the highest offices are generally possessed, and the whole detail of the administration conducted, by men who were educated in the middle and inferior ranks of life, who have been carried forward by their own industry and abilities, though loaded with the jealousy, and opposed by the resentment, of all those who were born their superiors, and to whom the great, after having regarded them first with contempt, and afterwards with envy, are at last contented to truckle with the same abject meanness with which they desire that the rest of mankind should behave to themselves.

It is the loss of this easy empire over the affections of mankind which renders the fall from greatness so insupportable. When the family of the king of Macedon was led in triumph by Paulus Aemilius, their misfortunes, it is said, made them divide with their conqueror the attention of the Roman people. The sight of the royal children, whose tender age rendered them insensible of their situation, struck the spectators, amidst the public rejoicings and prosperity, with the tenderest sorrow and compassion. The king appeared next in the procession; and seemed like one confounded and astonished, and bereft of all sentiment, by the greatness of his calamities. His friends and ministers followed after him. As they moved along, they often cast their eyes upon their fallen sovereign, and always burst into tears at the sight; their whole
behavior demonstrating that they thought not of their own misfortunes, but were occupied entirely by the superior greatness of his. The generous Romans, on the contrary, beheld him with disdain and indignation, and regarded as unworthy of all compassion the man who could be so mean-spirited as to bear to live under such calamities. Yet what did those calamities amount to? According to the greater part of historians, he was to spend the remainder of his days, under the protection of a powerful and humane people, in a state which in itself should seem worthy of envy, a state of plenty, ease, leisure, and security, from which it was impossible for him even by his own folly to fall. But he was no longer to be surrounded by that admiring mob of fools, flatterers, and dependents, who had formerly been accustomed to attend upon all his motions. He was no longer to be gazed upon by multitudes, nor to have it in his power to render himself the object of their respect, their gratitude, their love, their admiration. The passions of nations were no longer to mould themselves upon his inclinations. This was that insupportable calamity which bereaved the king of all sentiment; which made his friends forget their own misfortunes; and which the Roman magnanimity could scarce conceive how any man could be so mean-spirited as to bear to survive.

“Love,” says my Lord Rochefoucault, “is commonly succeeded by ambition; but ambition is hardly ever succeeded by love.”¹ That passion, when once it has got entire possession of the breast, will admit neither a rival nor a successor. To those who have been accustomed to the possession, or even to the hope of public admiration, all other pleasures sicken and decay. Of all the discarded statesmen who for their own ease have studied to get the better of ambition, and to despise those honors which they could no longer arrive at, how few have been able to succeed? The greater part have spent their time in the most listless and insipid indolence, chagrined at the thoughts of their own insignificancy, incapable of being interested in the occupations of private life, without enjoyment except when they talked of their former greatness, and without satisfaction except when they were employed in some vain project to recover it. Are you in earnest resolved never to barter your liberty for the lordly servitude of a court, but to live free, fearless, and independent? There seems to be one way to continue in that virtuous resolution; and perhaps but one. Never enter the place from whence so few have been able to return; never come within the circle of ambition; nor ever bring yourself into comparison with those masters of the earth who have already engrossed the attention of half mankind before you.

Of such mighty importance does it appear to be, in the imaginations of men, to stand in that situation which sets them most in the view of general sympathy and attention. And thus, place, that great object which divides the wives of aldermen,

¹[Rochefoucauld, Réflexions, ou Sentences et maximes morales, 5th ed. (Paris, 1678), no. 490.]
is the end of half the labors of human life; and is the cause of all the tumult and
bustle, all the rapine and injustice, which avarice and ambition have introduced into
this world. People of sense, it is said, indeed despise place; that is, they despise
sitting at the head of the table, and are indifferent who it is that is pointed out to
the company by that frivolous circumstance, which the smallest advantage is capable
of overbalancing. But rank, distinction, pre-eminence, no man despises, unless he
is either raised very much above, or sunk very much below, the ordinary standard
of human nature; unless he is either so confirmed in wisdom and real philosophy, as
to be satisfied that, while the propriety of his conduct renders him the just object
of approbation, it is of little consequence though he be neither attended to, nor
approved; or so habituated to the idea of his own meanness, so sunk in slothful
and sottish indifference, as entirely to have forgot the desire and almost the very
wish for superiority over his fellows.

As to become the natural object of the joyous congratulations and sympathetic
attentions of mankind is, in this manner, the circumstance which gives to prosperity
all its dazzling splendor; so nothing darkens so much the gloom of adversity as to feel
that our misfortunes are the objects, not of the fellow-feeling, but of the contempt and
aversion of our brethren. It is upon this account that the most dreadful calamities
are not always those which it is most difficult to support. It is often more mortifying
to appear in public under small disasters, than under great misfortunes. The first
excite no sympathy; but the second, though they may excite none that approaches
to the anguish of the sufferer, call forth, however, a very lively compassion. The
sentiments of the spectators are, in this last case, less wide of those of the sufferer,
and their imperfect fellow-feeling lends him some assistance in supporting his misery.
Before a gay assembly, a gentleman would be more mortified to appear covered with
filth and rags than with blood and wounds. This last situation would interest their
pity; the other would provoke their laughter. The judge who orders a criminal to be
set in the pillory, dishonors him more than if he had condemned him to the scaffold.
The great prince, who, some years ago, caned a general officer at the head of his
army, disgraced him irrecoverably. The punishment would have been much less had
he shot him through his body. By the laws of honor, to strike with a cane dishonors,
to strike with a sword does not, for an obvious reason. Those slighter punishments,
when inflicted on a gentleman, to whom dishonor is the greatest of all evils, come
to be regarded among a humane and generous people, as the most dreadful of any.
With regard to persons of that rank, therefore, they are universally laid aside, and
the law, while it takes their life upon many occasions, respects their honor upon
almost all. To scourge a person of quality, or to set him in the pillory, upon account
of any crime whatever, is a brutality of which no European government, except that
of Russia, is capable.

A brave man is not rendered contemptible by being brought to the scaffold; he is, by being set in the pillory. His behavior in the one situation may gain him universal esteem and admiration. No behavior in the other can render him agreeable. The sympathy of the spectators supports him in the one case, and saves him from that shame, that consciousness that his misery is felt by himself only, which is of all sentiments the most unsupportable. There is no sympathy in the other; or, if there is any, it is not with his pain, which is a trifle, but with his consciousness of the want of sympathy with which this pain is attended. It is with his shame, not with his sorrow. Those who pity him, blush and hang down their heads for him. He droops in the same manner, and feels himself irrecoverably degraded by the punishment, though not by the crime. The man, on the contrary, who dies with resolution, as he is naturally regarded with the erect aspect of esteem and approbation, so he wears himself the same undaunted countenance; and, if the crime does not deprive him of the respect of others, the punishment never will. He has no suspicion that his situation is the object of contempt or derision to any body, and he can, with propriety, assume the air, not only of perfect serenity, but of triumph and exultation.

“Great dangers,” says the Cardinal de Retz, “have their charms, because there is some glory to be got, even when we miscarry. But moderate dangers have nothing but what is horrible, because the loss of reputation always attends the want of success.”

His maxim has the same foundation with what we have been just now observing with regard to punishments.

Human virtue is superior to pain, to poverty, to danger, and to death; nor does it even require its utmost efforts to despise them. But to have its misery exposed to insult and derision, to be led in triumph, to be set up for the hand of scorn to point at, is a situation in which its constancy is much more apt to fail. Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported.

3 Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by this Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition

This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our

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2[Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz (Amsterdam, 1717), 1:273.]
moral sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages.

We desire both to be respectable and to be respected. We dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned. But, upon coming into the world, we soon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous. We see frequently the vices and follies of the powerful much less despised than the poverty and weakness of the innocent. To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own character and behavior; the one more gaudy and glittering in its coloring; the other more correct and more exquisitely beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious and careful observer. They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly, a select, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness.

The respect which we feel for wisdom and virtue is, no doubt, different from that which we conceive for wealth and greatness; and it requires no very nice discernment to distinguish the difference. But, notwithstanding this difference, those sentiments bear a very considerable resemblance to one another. In some particular features they are, no doubt, different, but, in the general air of the countenance, they seem to be so very nearly the same, that inattentive observers are very apt to mistake the one for the other.

In equal degrees of merit there is scarce any man who does not respect more the rich and the great, than the poor and the humble. With most men the presumption and vanity of the former are much more admired, than the real and solid merit of the latter. It is scarce agreeable to good morals, or even to good language, perhaps, to say, that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve
our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they almost constantly obtain it; and that they may, therefore, be considered as, in some respects, the natural objects of it. Those exalted stations may, no doubt, be completely degraded by vice and folly. But, the vice and folly must be very great, before they can operate this complete degradation. The profligacy of a man of fashion is looked upon with much less contempt and aversion, than that of a man of meaner condition. In the latter, a single transgression of the rules of temperance and propriety, is commonly more resented, than the constant and avowed contempt of them ever is in the former.

In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, are, happily, in most cases, very nearly the same. In all the middling and inferior professions, real and solid professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success. Abilities will even sometimes prevail where the conduct is by no means correct. Either habitual imprudence, however, or injustice, or weakness, or profligacy, will always cloud, and sometimes depress altogether, the most splendid professional abilities. Men in the inferior and middling stations of life, besides, can never be great enough to be above the law, which must generally overawe them into some sort of respect for, at least, the more important rules of justice. The success of such people, too, almost always depends upon the favor and good opinion of their neighbors and equals; and without a tolerably regular conduct these can very seldom be obtained. The good old proverb, therefore, that honesty is the best policy, holds, in such situations, almost always perfectly true. In such situations, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; and, fortunately for the good morals of society, these are the situations of the greater part of mankind.

In the superior stations of life the case is unhappily not always the same. In the courts of princes, in the drawing-rooms of the great, where success and preferment depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals, but upon the fanciful and foolish favor of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors; flattery and falsehood too often prevail over merit and abilities. In such societies the abilities to please, are more regarded than the abilities to serve. In quiet and peaceable times, when the storm is at a distance, the prince, or great man, wishes only to be amused, and is even apt to fancy that he has scarce any occasion for the service of any body, or that those who amuse him are sufficiently able to serve him. The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher, or a legislator. All the great and awful virtues, all the virtues which can fit, either for the council, the senate, or the field, are, by the
insolent and insignificant flatterers, who commonly figure the most in such corrupted
societies, held in the utmost contempt and derision. When the Duke of Sully was
called upon by Louis the Thirteenth, to give his advice in some great emergency, he
observed the favorites and courtiers whispering to one another, and smiling at his
unfashionable appearance. “Whenever your Majesty’s father,” said the old warrior
and statesman, “did me the honor to consult me, he ordered the buffoons of the court
to retire into the ante-chamber.”

It is from our disposition to admire, and consequently to imitate, the rich and the
great, that they are enabled to set, or to lead, what is called the fashion. Their dress
is the fashionable dress; the language of their conversation, the fashionable style;
their air and deportment, the fashionable behavior. Even their vices and follies are
fashionable; and the greater part of men are proud to imitate and resemble them in
the very qualities which dishonor and degrade them. Vain men often give themselves
airs of a fashionable profligacy, which, in their hearts, they do not approve of, and
of which, perhaps, they are really not guilty. They desire to be praised for what
they themselves do not think praiseworthy, and are ashamed of unfashionable virtues
which they sometimes practice in secret, and for which they have secretly some degree
of real veneration. There are hypocrites of wealth and greatness, as well as of religion
and virtue; and a vain man is as apt to pretend to be what he is not, in the one way,
as a cunning man is in the other. He assumes the equipage and splendid way of living
of his superiors, without considering that whatever may be praiseworthy in any of
these, derives its whole merit and propriety from its suitableness to that situation
and fortune which both require and can easily support the expense. Many a poor
man places his glory in being thought rich, without considering that the duties (if
one may call such follies by so venerable a name) which that reputation imposes upon
him, must soon reduce him to beggary, and render his situation still more unlike that
of those whom he admires and imitates, than it had been originally.

To attain to this envied situation, the candidates for fortune too frequently aban-
don the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road which leads to the one, and that
which leads to the other, lie sometimes in very opposite directions. But the ambi-
tious man flatters himself that, in the splendid situation to which he advances, he
will have so many means of commanding the respect and admiration of mankind,
and will be enabled to act with such superior propriety and grace, that the luster of
his future conduct will entirely cover, or efface, the foulness of the steps by which
he arrived at that elevation. In many governments the candidates for the highest
stations are above the law; and, if they can attain the object of their ambition, they
have no fear of being called to account for the means by which they acquired it. They
often endeavor, therefore, not only by fraud and falsehood, the ordinary and vulgar
arts of intrigue and cabal; but sometimes by the perpetration of the most enormous crimes, by murder and assassination, by rebellion and civil war, to supplant and destroy those who oppose or stand in the way of their greatness. They more frequently miscarry than succeed; and commonly gain nothing but the disgraceful punishment which is due to their crimes. But, though they should be so lucky as to attain that wished-for greatness, they are always most miserably disappointed in the happiness which they expect to enjoy in it. It is not ease or pleasure, but always honor, of one kind or another, though frequently an honor very ill understood, that the ambitious man really pursues. But the honor of his exalted station appears, both in his own eyes and in those of other people, polluted and defiled by the baseness of the means through which he rose to it. Though by the profusion of every liberal expense; though by excessive indulgence in every profligate pleasure, the wretched, but usual, resource of ruined characters; though by the hurry of public business, or by the prouder and more dazzling tumult of war, he may endeavor to efface, both from his own memory and from that of other people, the remembrance of what he has done; that remembrance never fails to pursue him. He invokes in vain the dark and dismal powers of forgetfulness and oblivion. He remembers himself what he has done, and that remembrance tells him that other people must likewise remember it. Amidst all the gaudy pomp of the most ostentatious greatness; amidst the venal and vile adulation of the great and of the learned; amidst the more innocent, though more foolish, acclamations of the common people; amidst all the pride of conquest and the triumph of successful war, he is still secretly pursued by the avenging furies of shame and remorse; and, while glory seems to surround him on all sides, he himself, in his own imagination, sees black and foul infamy fast pursuing him, and every moment ready to overtake him from behind. Even the great Caesar, though he had the magnanimity to dismiss his guards, could not dismiss his suspicions. The remembrance of Pharsalia still haunted and pursued him. When, at the request of the senate, he had the generosity to pardon Marcellus, he told that assembly, that he was not unaware of the designs which were carrying on against his life; but that, as he had lived long enough both for nature and for glory, he was contented to die, and therefore despised all conspiracies. He had, perhaps, lived long enough for nature. But the man who felt himself the object of such deadly resentment from those whose favor he wished to gain, and whom he still wished to consider as his friends, had certainly lived too long for real glory; or for all the happiness which he could ever hope to enjoy in the love and esteem of his equals.