\documentclass[12 pt, oneside]{article}   	% use ''amsart'' instead of ''article'' for AMSLaTeX format
\usepackage{geometry}                		% See geometry.pdf to learn the layout options. There are lots.
\geometry{letterpaper}                   		% ... or a4paper or a5paper or ... 
%\geometry{landscape}                		% Activate for rotated page geometry
%\usepackage[parfill]{parskip}    		% Activate to begin paragraphs with an empty line rather than an indent
\usepackage{graphicx}				% Use pdf, png, jpg, or eps§ with pdflatex; use eps in DVI mode
								% TeX will automatically convert eps --> pdf in pdflatex		

\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[english]{babel}
 
\usepackage{ebgaramond}

\usepackage{relsize}

\usepackage[colorlinks, hyperfootnotes=false, urlcolor=blue]{hyperref}


\title{Cause and Effect\footnote{This is Chapter 2 of Shepherd's \textit{An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of That Relation} (1824); the original chapter bears no title. Original text from the \href{https://archive.org/details/essayuponrelatio00shepiala/page/n8}{Internet Archive}; notes and modernized text by \href{http://www.trevorpearce.com/}{Trevor Pearce}.}}
\author{Mary Shepherd}
\date{1824}							% Activate to display a given date or no date



\begin{document}

\maketitle

Having now made an abstract of Mr. 
Hume's Treatise and Essays on the subject 
of the relation of cause and effect, I shall 
proceed to examine each part in as regular 
an order as I conveniently can; and endeavor to answer the two questions first proposed, in a more popular, and, I hope, not 
more illogical method than Mr. Hume has 
followed, by attempting to prove, 

\textbf{First}, that \textit{reason}, not \textit{fancy} and 
``custom,'' leads us to the knowledge, that 
every thing which begins to exist must have 
a cause.---\textbf{Secondly}, that reason forces 
the mind to perceive, that \textit{ similar causes} must necessarily produce \textit{similar effects}.---\textbf{Thirdly}, I shall thence establish a more 
philosophical definition of the relation of 
cause and effect.---\textbf{Fourthly}, show, in 
what respects Mr. Hume's definition is 
faulty.---\textbf{Fifthly}, proceed to prove that 
nature cannot be supposed to alter her course without a contradiction in terms; 
and, finally, show, that \textit{custom and habit} 
alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations 
in ordinary life.

After this, I shall endeavor to point out some material faults in Dr. Brown's 
reasoning, tending rather to support Mr. 
Hume's erroneous arguments, than to repel 
them: arguments which Mr. Lawrence 
avails himself of, in the Physiological Lectures, at present before the public; which 
have drawn so much of its notice; and 
upon which I shall not consider it irrelevant 
to make a few remarks.\footnote{[Thomas Brown's \textit{Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect} (3rd ed., 1822) and William Lawrence's \textit{Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of  Man} (1822) are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of Shepherd's \textit{An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect} (1824).]}

\subsection*{Section the First}

First, then, let me show, why Mr. Hume's 
argument, in favor of the possibility of 
beings commencing their own existence is 
sophistical; as well as his attempted confutation of those philosophers who have 
argued to the contrary. Mr. Hume says, 
the proposition, ``that whatever has a beginning, has also a cause of existence,'' cannot be demonstrated, because the ideas 
of cause and effect are ``distinct'' and 
``separable''; and it will be easy to conceive ``any object to be non-existent this 
minute,'' and ``existent the next''; without ``conjoining to it the idea of a cause, 
or a productive principle.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.3.1--3.]}---This imagination is plausible, and may perhaps appear 
well founded until thoroughly sifted. On a 
first impression, causes and their effects 
may seem separable, because two things 
are mentioned; one is distinct from the 
other, and may be \textit{imagined} separated 
from it. 

They may also \textit{seem} to follow one another, and \textit{time} to elapse between the \textit{operation of the cause}, and the \textit{appearance of the 
effect}; so that during the interval of the 
supposed period, the effect might be \textit{imagined in suspense}, and so indifferent to 
existence or non-existence; but upon a 
strict and rigid attention to the real nature 
of a thing in opposition to its accidental 
appearances, one cannot, for a moment, 
suppose that the circumstances here mentioned, namely, of antecedency of cause and subsequency of effect; or of that \textit{distinctness of language} which occasions two 
words to be used for two ideas; should in 
any degree render it possible for causes 
and their effects to exist apart in nature. 
That it is impossible for them to do so, 
without involving a direct contradiction in 
terms, is a proposition I hope to prove in 
the course of this Essay.

But before examining into this notion, 
concerning the possibility of effects being 
held in suspense, and then of being liable 
to begin their own existence, or, in Mr. 
Hume's words, ``of the separation of the 
idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence,'' it will be necessary 
to render the expressions in which it is 
conveyed more intelligible.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.3.3.]} This can in 
no way be done so long as the \textit{definition of 
the word effect} presupposes a cause; for 
the supposition of the objection lies, in 
its being possible for \textit{effects} to be held in 
suspense: but in order that this should be 
possible, the meaning of the word \textit{effect} 
must be altered. Then, if the ideas are 
altered that lie under the term, according as the varied occasion seems to require, 
there can be no philosophy; and it never 
can be insisted on, that the \textit{effects}, which 
are \textit{supposed to be conjoined} with their 
causes at one period of time; and to require, in order to their exhibition, those 
causes or others; and to receive the name 
of \textit{effects}, on account of requiring causes; 
can again, upon another occasion, not be 
\textit{effects}, not require \textit{causes}, be held in suspense, and be \textit{imagined} capable \textit{of beginning their existence by themselves}, without 
conjoining to them the distinct idea of any 
``productive principle.''---It might as well 
be reckoned sound reasoning, after defining the figure 2 to be a sign signifying 
that two units are necessary to its composition, to maintain, that because it stands 
\textit{singly}, it can be \textit{imagined a unit itself}, 
without a contradiction; so that it does 
not stand in need of 2 units to its composition:---that is, a word may be taken 
in two contradictory senses, and then it 
may be reasonable to predicate of each, 
affections that belong only to the other; 
and so to form any contradictory scheme 
in the world. To make, therefore, anything like a rational meaning in this sentence of Mr. Hume's, nothing more can be 
intended by it, than that we should imagine, those existences which we always 
observe conjoined with others in such a 
manner, that they \textit{appear} to be their effects, properties, or qualities, to owe them 
\textit{no real existence or dependence}; and therefore capable of being independent objects, 
and of beginning their own existence. In 
like manner, it may be said of \textit{causes}, that 
although the word signifies something calculated to introduce a certain quality, yet 
that in fact it does not introduce a new 
quality; thus naming the object in one 
sense, and imagining its essence in another 
sense. 

This also is as though we should agree 
to designate each unit by the figure 1; and 
to assert, that the union of two units introduces a compound notion, which shall 
be made known by the sign 2; and on account of this relation, the union of the 
units shall be called the cause of the compound quality two, under a single term; 
and the sign 2 shall be named its \textit{effect}; and afterwards assert, that we can \textit{imagine} 
the \textit{cause}, that is the \textit{union of the two units}, 
to exist without, and separate from, the 
effect, the result 2. All this cannot take 
place whilst we assign the same meaning 
to our words; and if we use the terms in 
different senses, there can be no philosophy.---Therefore, to make any meaning 
whatever of the proposition, ``we may imagine causes to exist separate from their effects''; the objects we call \textit{causes} 
are not to be imagined as \textit{causes}, but may 
be supposed \textit{not to cause anything}, but to 
exist without \textit{determining their own effects}, 
or \textit{any others}; that is, causes and their 
effects are so evidently distinct, that they 
may be imagined to be unconnected objects, that are \textit{not causes and effects}, and to 
exist separately without a contradiction, 
though they are named expressly as signs 
of the ideas we have, that they are necessary to one another. 

Thus, the original question, namely, ``Whether everything which begins to exist requires a cause for its existence?'' resolves itself into two others; viz. 

First, whether objects called \textsc{effects}, necessarily require causes for their existence? Or, whether they may begin to exist with, or without them indifferently?---As also, 

Secondly, Whether any objects whatever, without being considered as having 
the \textit{nature of effects}, can begin their existences? 

It may be plainly seen, that the first of 
these questions is sunk in the latter, because, if objects \textit{usually considered as effects} need not be considered as effects, then 
they are forced to begin their existences 
\textit{of themselves}; for, conjoined or not to 
their causes, we know by our senses that 
they do begin to exist: we will, therefore, 
immediately hasten to the consideration of 
the second question, which may be stated 
in the following terms: Whether every object which begins to exist must owe its 
existence to a cause? 

Let the object which we suppose to begin its existence of itself be imagined, 
abstracted from the nature of all objects we are acquainted with, saving in its capacity for existence; let us suppose it to 
be \textit{no effect}; there shall be no prevening 
circumstances whatever that affect it, nor 
any existence in the universe: let it be so; 
let there be nought but a blank; and 
a mass of whatsoever can be supposed not 
to require a cause \textsc{start forth} into existence, and make the first breach on the 
wide nonentity around;---now, what is this 
starting forth, beginning, coming into existence, but an action, which is a quality 
of an object not yet in being, and so not 
possible to have its qualities determined, 
nevertheless exhibiting its qualities? 

If, indeed, it should be shown, that 
there is no proposition whatever taken as 
a ground on which to build an argument 
in this question, neither one conclusion 
nor the other can be supported; and there 
need be no attempt at reasoning.---But, if 
my adversary allows that, no existence being supposed previously in the universe, 
existence, in order to be, must \textit{begin to be}, 
and that the notion of \textit{beginning an action} 
(the being that \textit{begins} it not supposed yet in existence), involves a \textit{contradiction in 
terms}; then this \textit{beginning} to exist cannot 
appear but as a \textit{capacity some nature hath} 
to alter the presupposed nonentity, and to 
act for itself, whilst itself is not in being.---The original assumption may deny, as 
much as it pleases, all cause of existence; 
but, whilst in its very idea, the commencement of existence is an effect predicated 
of some supposed cause, (\textit{because the quality 
of an object} which must be \textit{in existence to 
possess it},) we must conclude that \textit{there is no 
object which begins to exist, but must owe its 
existence to some cause}. 

For this reason it is, that the answers 
to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Locke are unsound, 
in as far as they are an endeavor to show, 
that their arguments are altogether sophistical.---Mr. Hume objects to them, 
that the existence supposed to begin 
by itself, ``is not to be considered 
as an \textit{effect}; and that these authors assume what is not granted, viz. that the 
existence in question requires \textit{a cause}''; as where Dr. Clarke shows it is an absurdity to imagine an object its \textit{own cause}, and Mr. Locke asserts that it is equally so, to 
conceive of \textit{nothing} as a cause.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.3.5--6.]} It is undoubtedly true, that these authors assumed 
that which was in question; namely, that 
every existence must have a cause: but, 
as everything not yet in existence, \textit{to exist 
at all}, must \textit{begin}, and as the \textit{beginning} of 
anything must always be supposed, by the 
\textit{nature of the action}, to be a quality of 
something in existence, which existence is 
yet \textsc{denied} by the statement of the question, these philosophers felt the involved 
absurdity so great, that they passed over 
the first question as too ridiculous, probably, to consider formally; then showed, that the mind of man was forced 
to look upon all things which begin to 
exist as \textit{dependent} \textsc{qualities}; and thus, that 
an object could neither depend upon \textit{itself 
for existence}, nor yet upon \textit{nothing}. 

Let it be remembered, too, that although Mr. Hume inveighs against this 
method as sophistical, by conceiving it 
begs the question, yet his own argument, 
the whole way, consists in the possibility 
of imagining an \textit{effect} ``\textit{non-existent} this minute,'' and ``existing the next''; and 
does not himself consider any other ``sort of 
being'' possible; and has no other way of 
supporting his own notion of the beginning of existence by itself, except under 
the \textit{idea of an effect in suspense}; which is 
still a \textit{relative term}, and begs the question 
for the necessity of its correlative, i.e. its 
\textit{cause}, just as much as he asserts his adversaries do, whom he declares to be illogical reasoners. 

If then (as I hope I have shown) all 
objects whatever, which \textit{begin to exist}, 
must owe their \textit{existence to some cause}, those 
we usually consider as effects \textsc{cannot} be 
held in suspense; suddenly alter their nature; be ``non-existent this minute, and 
existent the next''; and, though always 
introduced as \textit{qualities of other objects}, be 
easily separated from the ideas of their 
causes, and require no ``productive principle.''

``That cause and effect are distinct 
and separable''; so ``that any object may 
be conceived, as therefore \textit{capable of beginning its own existence},'' must be considered 
as among the notions adopted in \textit{the Essays}: 
what else is the meaning of such propositions as these: ``There appears not throughout all nature, any one instance of connection, as conceivable by us''; ``one event follows another,'' ``but we never 
can observe \textit{any tie between them}, etc.''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 7.26.} 
Indeed, the not admitting ``\textit{any relations of 
ideas},'' or ``\textit{any reasonings a priori},'' (so 
as to be capable of supporting the idea of 
\textsc{causation} as a \textit{creating principle} absolutely 
necessary in the universe) is but repeating 
``the \textit{juvenile ideas}'' of the Treatise, and 
``\textit{casting them anew in these later pieces}.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.18]; Hume, \textit{Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects} (1777), Advertisement.}

Before I proceed further, I wish my 
reader to grant the proposition, ``that a 
being cannot begin its existence of itself''; because I mean to make use of it in my 
further reply to Mr. Hume's doctrines; 
and, unless this step is allowed, I can 
make no further progress in this argument. 

\subsection*{Section the Second}

We will now proceed to the second 
part of the original inquiry; that is, ``why 
we conclude that such particular causes 
must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from one to the other, 
and of the belief we repose in it?''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.2.15.]} The 
question, however, ought to stand thus, 
``why \textsc{like causes} must necessarily have 
\textsc{like effects}?'' Because what is really enquired into, is the \textit{general notion of necessary connection}, between \textit{all like} cause and 
effect; and by thus putting the question 
respecting \textit{particulars only}, although they 
might be included in an universal answer, 
yet no answer applicable to them \textsc{merely}, 
could authorize a \textit{universal axiom}. The 
manner of stating the enquiry in \textit{the Essays}, 
is also too vaguely expressed, (although it 
be evident that it is the \textit{general relation} 
which is enquired into.) Mr. Hume says, 
``we will now enquire, how we arrive at the 
\textit{knowledge of cause and effect}.''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.5.} It ought 
to be stated, how we arrive at the knowledge 
of the \textit{necessary connection}, between \textit{like} 
cause and effect? 

Let it be remembered, that Mr. Hume 
says, ``this principle is nothing but custom 
and habit''; that ``belief in necessary 
connection is nothing but an intense 
and steady conception, arising from 
the customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses; that when flame and 
heat, cold and snow, have always been 
conjoined together, there is such a customary conjunction between them, that when flame and snow are anew presented to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat and cold.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 5.8.]}

``That \textit{reason} can never show us the 
connection of one object with another, 
though aided by experience''; for ``we can 
at least \textit{conceive a change in the course 
of nature}.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.6.12, 1.3.6.5.]} That necessary connection is 
``nothing but an internal act of the mind, 
determined to carry its thoughts from 
one object to another.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.14.20.]} Thus necessary 
connection of cause and effect is only a 
custom of the mind! Power is only a custom of the mind! Expectations, and experience, are only customs of the mind! The consequence of which doctrine is, that 
as a \textit{custom of the mind} is entirely a different circumstance from the \textit{operation of 
nature}, we may ``\textit{conceive}'' at least the 
contrary of what we have been accustomed 
to may take place,---we may conceive the 
``course of nature to change.''

Now it is my intention to show, in contradiction to these ideas of Mr. Hume, that 
it is reason, and not custom, which guides 
our minds in forming the notions of necessary connection, of belief and of expectation.\footnote{I conceive it impossible to have a complete conviction that every effect is inherent, or contained in its 
cause, until the mind be imbued with the knowledge, 
that objects are but unknown circumstances in nature, 
when unperceived by the senses; which when perceived, 
exhibit their appropriate qualities accordingly; and which 
then appear in certain defined masses, as to the different 
senses they affect, as to their figure, etc.; and receive an 
arbitrary name for their assemblage. They must have 
also among each other certain proportions. When these 
unknown circumstances, (or affections, or substances,) in 
nature, \textit{mix}, and are thereby \textit{altered}, \textit{the qualities which 
affect the senses} are in the \textit{same proportions altered}, and 
are necessarily included in those objects as their effects. 
But this part of the subject, is of such moment that a separate consideration of it is intended.}

In order to this let us bear in mind the 
reasoning already adduced in the foregoing 
chapter, and it thence immediately follows, 
that objects which we know by our senses 
do begin their existences, and by our reason know they cannot begin it of themselves, must begin it by the operation of 
some other beings in existence, producing 
these new qualities in nature, and introducing them to our observation. The very 
meaning of the word cause, is \textit{producer} 
or \textit{creator}; of effect, the \textit{produced} or \textit{created}---and the idea is gained by such an observance of nature, as we think is efficient 
in any given case, to an \textit{experimentum crucis}.\footnote{[``A decisive test that shows which one of several hypotheses is correct.'' (OED).]} 

Long observation of the invariableness 
of antecedency, and subsequency, is not 
wanted; many trials are not wanted, to 
generate the notion of \textit{producing power}. 

One trial is enough, in such circumstances, as will bring the mind to the following reasoning. 

Here is a new quality, which appears 
to my senses: 

But it could not arise of itself; nor 
could any surrounding objects, but one (or more) affect it; therefore that one, (or 
more) have occasioned it, for there is nothing else to make a difference; and a 
\textit{difference} could not ``\textit{begin of itself}.''

This is an argument, which all persons, 
however illiterate, feel the force of. It is 
the only foundation for the demonstrations 
of the laboratory of the chemist; which all 
life resembles, and so closely, in many instances, that the philosopher, and the vulgar, are equally sure of what cause is 
absolutely necessary to the production of 
certain effects; for instance, each knows that 
in certain given circumstances, \textit{the closing of 
the eye} will eclipse the prospect of nature; 
and the slight motion of reopening it, 
will restore all the objects to view. Therefore, the eye (in these circumstances,) 
is the \textit{cause or producer of vision}. \textsc{One} 
trial would be enough, under certain \textit{known} 
circumstances.\footnote{When more trials are needed than \textsc{one}, it is in order 
to \textit{detect} the circumstances, not to lay a \textit{foundation for the 
general principle}, that a \textsc{like} cause repeated, a \textsc{like} 
effect will take place.} Why? Not from ``\textit{custom},'' because there has been \textit{one trial only}; 
but from \textit{reason}, because vision not being 
able \textit{to produce itself, nor any of the surrounding objects by the supposition}; it is the 
\textit{eye} which must necessarily perform the 
operation; for there is nothing else to make 
a difference; and a different quality could 
not ``\textit{begin its own existence}.'' It is this sort of \textsc{reasoning upon experiment}, which takes place in every man's mind, concerning every affair in life, which generates the 
notion of power, and necessary connection; 
and gives birth to that maxim, ``\textit{a like 
cause must produce a like effect}.'' The 
circumstances being supposed the same on 
a second occasion as on a former one, and 
carefully observed to be so; the eye when 
opened would be expected to let in light, 
and all her objects. ``I observe (says the 
mind) in this or any other case, all the 
prevening circumstances the same as before; for there is nothing to make a difference; and a difference cannot arise 
without something to occasion it; else 
there would be a beginning of existence by itself, which is impossible.''

It is this compound idea, therefore, \textit{the 
result of the experience of what does take 
place upon any given trial}, \textsc{mixed} with the 
\textit{reasoning that nothing else could ensue}, un- 
less on the one hand, \textit{efficient causes were 
allowed for the alteration}; or, on the other, 
that things could ``\textit{alter their existences} \textsc{for 
themselves}''; which generates the notion 
of \textit{power or} ``\textit{producing principle},'' \textit{and for 
which we have formed the word}. 

It is in vain to say that a habit of association of ideas from observing ``\textit{contiguity 
in time, and place},'' between objects is all 
we know of \textit{power}; a habit of the mind 
will not begin \textit{existence}, will not \textit{introduce 
a quality}.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.1.4.1.]} The really philosophical method 
of viewing the subject is this: that objects 
in relation to us, are nothing but masses 
of certain qualities, affecting certain of our 
senses; and which, when independent of 
our senses, are \textit{unknown} powers or qualities in nature. These masses change 
their qualities by their mixture with any 
other mass, and then the corresponding 
qualities determined to the senses must 
of course also change. These changed 
qualities, are termed \textit{effects}; or \textit{consequents}; but are really no more than \textsc{new 
qualities} arising from \textit{new objects}, which 
have been formed by the \textit{junctions of other 
objects} (previously formed) or might be considered as the \textit{unobserved qualities of existing objects}; which \textit{shall be observed when 
properly exhibited}. 

If then an existence now in being, \textit{conjoined with any other}, forms thereby \textit{a new 
nature}, capable of exhibiting \textit{new qualities}, 
these new qualities must enter into the definition of the objects; they become a part 
of their natures; and when by careful experiment, or judicious observation, no new 
prevening circumstances are supposed to 
make an alteration in the conjunction of 
the same bodies, the \textit{new qualities}, that are 
named \textit{effects}, are expected without a doubt 
to arise upon every such conjunction; because, they as much belong to this \textit{newly 
combined nature}, as the original qualities 
did to each separate nature, before their 
conjunction. So little is custom the principle of cause and effect, that if upon the 
\textit{first} and original trial of the element of fire, all surrounding circumstances were put 
away from having any influence over it, 
saving the body it destroyed; that power 
of \textit{discerptibility} would be ever after considered as one of its qualities; as much as 
its color or its light, or its warmth, without 
the presence of which, it would not be 
fire. 

This conjunction with a grosser material 
than itself, is the new circumstance, on 
which it exhibits its essential and permanent quality of discerptibility to the senses; 
now if the trial be complete, when upon a 
second occasion an object having the same 
sensible qualities as fire hath, known 
also to have been elicited from the same 
prevening circumstances, meets with the 
same gross body as heretofore, it must of 
\textit{necessity} consume it. There is nothing to 
make a \textit{difference}. A \textit{difference} is an \textit{effect}, 
a \textit{change of being}, an \textit{altered existence}, an 
existence which \textit{cannot} ``\textit{begin of itself}'' any more than any other in nature; could 
the fire be supposed not to consume the 
gross body, there would be a difference of 
qualities, that is, new qualities, which by the data there is no cause for. The original circumstances, of which fire is the 
compound effect, from which it results as 
a \textit{formed object}, are supposed to be ordered 
the same as on a former occasion; these 
are necessarily compelled to be attended 
with the same effects or combined qualities; 
otherwise there would be the ``\textit{beginnings 
of existence}'' by themselves, which has before been shown to be impossible. But 
the \textit{combined qualities}, are the whole qualities that fire in every circumstance, is capable of producing. Meeting, therefore, with 
a gross body, which on any one occasion, 
in certain circumstances, it once consumed; 
under the same circumstances, it must necessarily again consume it. That \textsc{differences of existence} cannot begin of themselves; is therefore the second conclusion 
supposed to be established. 

``\textit{Antecedency} and \textit{subsequency},'' are 
therefore immaterial to the proper definition of cause and effect; on the 
contrary, although an object, in order to 
act as a cause, must be in being antecedently to such action; yet when it \textit{acts as a cause}, its \textit{effects} are \textit{synchronous 
with that action}, and are \textit{included in it}; 
which a close inspection into the nature of 
cause will prove. For effects are no more 
than the new qualities, of newly formed 
objects. Each conjunction of bodies, (now 
separately in existence, and of certain defined qualities,) produces upon their union 
those new natures, whose qualities must 
necessarily \textit{be in}, and \textit{with them, in the 
very moment of their formation}. 

Thus \textit{the union of two distinct natures}, is 
the \textit{cause}, \textit{producer} or \textit{creator} of another; 
which must instantly, and immediately, have 
all its peculiar qualities; but the cause has 
not acted, is not completed, till the \textit{union} has taken place, and the new nature is 
formed with all its qualities, \textit{in}, and \textit{about it}. 
\textit{Cause producing effect}, therefore, under 
the strict eye of philosophical scrutiny, is 
a \textit{new object} exhibiting \textit{new qualities}; or 
shortly, the formation of a new \textit{mass of 
qualities}. A \textit{chain of conjunctions of bodies}, 
of course, \textit{occupies time}; and is the reason why the careless observation of philosophers, enabling them to take notice only of some one distinct effect, (after perhaps innumerable successive conjunctions 
of bodies,) occasions the mistake, by which 
they consider \textit{subsequency of effect}, as a part 
of the \textit{essential definition} of that term; and 
\textit{priority}, as \textit{essential} to the nature of cause. 

As a short illustration of the doctrine 
unfolded, let us take the idea of nourishment, considered as the effect, subsequent 
to the taking of food, its cause. Here the 
\textit{nature} of nourishment, is \textit{a process} which 
begins to act immediately that food is in 
conjunction with the stomach. ``That we 
are nourished'' is only the last result of a 
continuous chain of causes and effects, in 
formation from the first moment the food 
enters the stomach, to that, in which every 
particle is absorbed and deposited in the 
proper place in the body. Here, the capacity of food to exhibit certain qualities, 
when in conjunction with the body, is 
shown; the nature of the human body, to 
exhibit certain other qualities, in consequence of that conjunction, is also shown; 
but the \textit{effect of nourishment}, being \textit{subsequent} to, and at such a distance of time from, the original cause, is only so, on 
account of its being the effect of a vast 
number of causes, or unions of objects in 
succession, of which the union of the stomach and the food was first in order. 

Our deficient observation, is apt to prevent our taking notice of the second, third, or 
indefinite number of effects; which arise in 
consequence of as many conjunctions of 
objects.

But the first, and other \textit{effects} successively, are as much and entirely synchronous with their \textit{causes}, as any other quality 
of any single object, which is always exhibited along with it. 

Secondly. It is also quite immaterial to the 
definition of this relation, whether an untried, or unobserved quality, be called 
\textit{quality}, or \textit{effect}. The unknown or at present undetermined quality, which is termed 
an effect, might always change its place 
with some \textit{known quality}, and not bear 
the name of effect; and \textit{vice versa}: Thus, 
a blind man may call the object which warmed, or burned him, fire; but his eyes 
being supposed suddenly to open, he would 
consider the flame and its brilliant colour 
as the \textit{effects} of fire; whilst he who sees 
fire constantly, being able always to take 
notice of its flame and color, considers 
them as the constant and unvarying \textit{qualities} of fire, and which render the substance 
before him worthy of bearing that name; 
but the quality of burning, which he does 
not \textit{constantly} experience, he names an 
\textit{effect} or \textit{consequence} of fire previously being 
in existence. But the true method of looking upon the subject is this---that fire, in 
order to deserve the name it bears, must 
comprehend all its qualities \textit{tried} and \textit{untried}; \textit{observed} and \textit{unobserved}; \textit{determined} 
and \textit{undetermined}; it deserves the name 
only on account of its being a certain defined object; \textit{elicited from certain causes 
observed to be efficient to its production}; and 
by the very conditions of the question, is allowed to be \textit{the same}. But an object 
is nothing else (in relation to \textit{us},) than a 
mass of peculiar qualities; and when observations inform us, that any known mass is 
produced by similar circumstances, on various occasions; such mass or object must 
necessarily contain all its qualities, and be 
equal to exhibit all its effects in hitherto 
untried events. Upon any occasion where 
we are either certain, or have a high probability, that an object presented to us is 
truly similar to a former one, and was 
created by the same causes; we expect all 
tried qualities to be the same as before, and 
any \textit{untried} quality, (that is, any quality not 
in present operation, though previously 
ascertained,) must belong ever after to its 
definition. All that is necessary is to be 
correct, as to the prevening or influencing 
circumstances which gave \textit{birth to the object}. They being the same on any two or 
more occasions, the object elicited must 
necessarily be the same---but it is not the 
same, unless it hath all its \textit{qualities}, and no 
other than its qualities. Therefore fire, in 
order to have a right to the sign of the 
word fire, for an expression of its attributes, 
in order to be a ``\textit{like cause},'' must of 
necessity burn as much as it must be red, 
otherwise the red object were not fire; and 
\textit{could not have been produced by those 
causes that elicit that element}. I mean therefore to conclude, that effects are but 
the qualities of an object not experienced 
by some of the senses of the human frame, 
whilst certain others at present touch it; 
\textit{the knowledge of which last}, being joined 
to the observation of the \textsc{whence} the object 
was produced, beget the knowledge of 
what new untried qualities may be expected in future under given circumstances. It 
becomes therefore part of the definition of 
fire to burn certain bodies, to melt others; 
of bread to nourish the human body; of 
snow to be cold, and white; and these qualities they must have, in order to compose 
that entire \textit{enumeration of qualities}, for 
which appropriate names have been formed, 
and to the exhibition of which similar and 
efficient causes have been in action. 

If it should be said, that in considering 
objects as masses of combined qualities, the 
\textit{result} of like causes previously in action, 
we beg the question not yet supposed 
to be granted,---I answer; that \textit{like} causes, 
that is, \textit{like} objects, are by the supposition admitted, and then the question 
arises, whether it is demonstrable they must have like effects or qualities, \textit{under 
like circumstances in future?} I answer, 
they must have like effects, or qualities, because there is nothing else \textit{given} that can be 
supposed to make a difference; and a difference of qualities could not arise of \textit{itself}, 
could not begin its own existence; and I 
add, not only, there is nothing else \textit{supposed} that can make a difference; but that 
when we also know that in the \textsc{formation} of any object no difference took place; 
then, \textit{there is no ground whatever}, for 
imagining \textit{the possibility} of an \textit{alteration} in \textit{the effects of that object}. But although 
it be very difficult in the analysis of this 
question, not to use the word \textit{cause} in its 
intended sense, before the definition of the 
word is given, and although it be true that 
in this last observation I may have done so 
in saying, \textit{that objects must be the same which 
are elicited from like causes}, i.e. \textit{from the junction of like prevening circumstances}; (and 
which position will be fully borne out in the 
process of the argument;) yet a fastidious 
reader may omit every such reference to the 
notion of cause; for the argument is perfect without it, and stands thus: 

\textit{Effects} are nothing but those \textit{same conjunctions of qualities}, which in other words 
are admitted as \textit{similar causes}, in the supposition of the question. The objects 
(whose \textit{union is necessary} to a given result,) 
must certainly exist, \textit{antecedent} to such an 
union. But it is \textit{in their} \textsc{union}, there exists 
those \textit{newly formed objects}, or masses of 
qualities called \textit{effects}, which are therefore 
\textit{identical} with the \textit{similar cause}; for in \textit{this 
union}, cause and effect are \textit{synchronous}, and 
they are but different words for the same 
\textit{essence}. Fire and wood must be antecedent to combustion, no doubt; but in the 
\textit{union of fire and wood}, there exists immediately \textit{combustion} as a new event in nature;---also in this union exists the similar 
\textit{cause} allowed by the \textit{data}, whilst combustion is also termed the \textit{effect} of the union 
of fire and wood; but, however termed, an 
\textit{effect}, is in fact a new but similar object as heretofore. A \textit{similar} mass of qualities, in kind, which cannot therefore be a 
\textit{different} mass of qualities in kind.---Equals 
added to equals upon any two occasions, 
the whole must be equal; add equal qualities to equal qualities, the sum of the qualities must be equal upon every repetition 
of the junction;---and the \textit{sum} must be the 
\textit{same result} taken twice over, not two \textit{different}, or possibly \textit{altered sums}. Therefore I 
repeat, that in the consideration of the 
nature of cause and effect, it is immaterial 
whether the yet unframed qualities of objects, previous to their junction, be named 
\textit{effects}; they are to be considered as qualities; and qualities may be considered as 
\textit{effects}, under any circumstances that prevent 
their usual exhibition. Effects when developed are no more than qualities; and qualities previous to their development are in 
our imagination considered as effects. 

Thirdly. Again, it is immaterial to the definition of the relation of cause and effect, that 
we are not acquainted with the ``secret powers'' of natural objects, either before or after 
experience; for when we find, that in any 
distinct and given circumstances they put on 
certain qualities to the senses, their secret 
powers and properties must be qualified in 
all \textit{like circumstances} to be the same, and 
are obliged to be so; because no contrary 
qualities could ``begin their existences of themselves''; and by the \textit{supposition} there 
is no \textit{cause in the circumstances}, to give rise 
to any \textit{differences in the qualities}. Indeed, 
Mr. Hume makes a great mistake in supposing it necessary to demonstrate, in every 
particular instance, what \textit{particular} effect 
must necessarily flow from its object, in 
order to gain the idea of \textit{necessary connection}. The \textit{how} and the \textit{why} have nothing to do with the general reasoning affecting the 
general proposition; for ``whether like 
Causes shall produce like Effects'' is \textit{not} a 
question exactly the same as whether 
``such particular causes shall have such 
\textit{particular} effects?''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.15.8, 1.3.2.15; note that these are not the exact sections cited by Shepherd.]} Which Mr. Hume seems 
to consider as precisely of the same import; 
whereas \textit{one is a general} question, which 
however answered, in the \textit{affirmative} or \textit{negative}, would apply to \textit{particulars}. But supposing in each \textit{particular} instance under our 
notice, we could descry the ``\textit{secret powers 
of nature},'' the general question concerning 
\textit{all} like causes would still remain unanswered; and an universal conclusion could 
not logically be deduced from the particular premises concerning it: as will be more 
fully argued in the discussion upon Dr. Brown's reasoning. 

If it should be asked, (as Mr. Hume 
presently does,) how is it known when objects are similar upon any two occasions; 
the ``sensible qualities may be the same, and 
not the \textit{secret powers, upon which the effects depend?}''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.16.]} I answer, this is to \textit{shift} the 
question from the examination of \textit{like causes 
supposed}, to the consideration of the \textit{method 
whereby their presence} may be \textit{detected}.\footnote{I should not here have taken notice of this objection, but that as Mr. Hume does suddenly shift the question, 
so I would not appear to avoid an answer to it: otherwise it 
is something too early to enter upon the subject; obliging 
me to make use of my argument previously to its complete 
development. But the reader may pass over to the next 
section if he please.} But this difficulty is met, and considered in, 
its proper place; I shall only here say, that 
as the \textit{secret powers} are the real external 
unknown causes in nature, which determine the sensible qualities, as well as \textit{every 
other effect}; so when we find the sensible 
qualities the same on any two occasions, we are sure the secret powers are similar 
\textit{thus far}, and therefore fitted to exhibit their 
further similar effects;---(or \textit{combined secret 
powers and sensible qualities};) and although 
some \textit{unobserved} cause might creep in to 
alter the object, whilst appearing the same, 
yet this we do not \textit{imagine} when we are 
not aware of it, especially in cases where 
the same sensible qualities have been regularly exhibited along with like secret 
powers; for this regularity is perceived as 
an \textit{effect}, for which there must be a proportional \textit{cause}, and begets a proportional 
belief accordingly.---We argue from the \textit{regular effects}, (the sensible qualities;) to 
the \textit{regular causes}, (the secret powers;) 
which having been equal to certain other 
\textit{effects or properties}, we expect again the 
same, under similar circumstances. We 
argue from the regular \textit{ends} nature keeps 
in view, up to nature's God, who ordained 
them, and who must be supposed still to 
continue true to those ends; and along with 
the grander operations of nature, we may 
often in many cases observe our own actions, and those of others, conspiring only to 
fashion similar objects. But when the \textit{secret powers}, and sensible qualities, are known, \textit{or 
supposed the same}, the conclusion is demonstrative; \textit{so must be the effects}. Whilst, 
were it possible to know the secret powers 
in each \textit{particular} past instance, \textit{universal} 
truth would not thence result. Neither has 
Mr. Hume any right to make this argument; 
because to conceive ``there may be secret 
powers which may change the effects, 
dependent on them,'' is to make use of 
the relation between cause and effect, as 
of a really necessary connection, in order to 
oppose his adversary: a principle which he 
previously refuses to admit. Also the objection forms an illogical argument in another way. For it virtually draws a general conclusion from \textit{two negative premises}. To 
assert, that like sensible qualities merely, 
will \textsc{not} produce like effects; and, that \textit{like 
sensible qualities} are \textsc{not} \textit{like causes}, is to 
separate the middle term both from the subject and from the predicate of the general 
question. By \textit{such an argument} Mr. Hume 
is certainly right in supposing, that \textsc{reason} 
cannot support ``\textit{our conclusions concerning the operations of cause and effect}.''

Having thus cleared a way, towards the 
comprehension of this relation of cause and 
effect, we will proceed to a definition of 
those terms in the next section. 

\subsection*{Section the Third}

A cause, therefore, is such action of an 
object, as shall enable it, in conjunction 
with another, to form a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from 
those of either of the objects unconjoined. 
This is really to be a producer of new being.---This is a generation, or \textit{creation}, of 
qualities not conceived of, antecedently to 
their existence;---and not merely an ``\textit{idea 
always followed by another},'' on account of 
a ``\textit{customary association between them}.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 7.30.]}

An effect is the produced quality exhibited to the senses, as the essential property of natures so conjoined. Necessary connection of cause and effect is the obligation qualities have to inhere in their 
objects, and to exhibit their varieties according to the different human senses with 
which they come in contact. Power is but 
another word for efficient cause, or ``productive principle''; and signifies the \textit{property} which lies in the \textit{secret nature of 
objects}, when unobserved by the senses, 
and which determines the qualities that 
can be exhibited to them upon every new 
conjunction.---An \textit{object} may be defined, a 
\textit{combined mass of qualities}; the result of 
proportional unknown circumstances in nature, meeting with the human senses. 

But Mr. Hume's three definitions of the 
relation of cause and effect are, in many 
respects, faulty, and not borne out by his 
own arguments; for he defines a cause 
``an object followed by another, and where 
all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 7.29.]}---Now, if he means an object that will in 
\textit{future}, as in \textit{past} times, be always followed by another; an \textit{invariable} necessity in 
the antecedent to be followed by its subsequent, his whole argument tends to prove 
the \textit{contrary}, and to show that experience 
has power to answer for the \textit{past} only, and 
cannot for the future; for, that we may 
conceive a ``change in the course of nature,'' and that imagination supplies only the notion of \textit{invariable} expectation from 
``custom''; that this is the sense of the 
passage containing the original definition, we may be sure of, from what follows; for he goes on to say, ``or in other words, where if the first object had not 
been, the second never had existed''; but 
this idea expresses a much stricter necessity 
of connection than does the relation of any 
number of objects, which had only followed 
each other in \textit{past time}, however often 
their antecedency and subsequency had 
been repeated. Such a necessity is contradicted the whole way by the argument. 
It is quite another sentiment, from that 
which arises from the ideas of always \textit{before and after}. That which requires another object to its existence, must be \textit{necessarily connected} with it; and I contend 
that it is so connected, as a \textit{new quality} of 
an altered mode of existence. But Mr. 
Hume says, it is only connected, as an invariable subsequent, must always be understood to require its invariable antecedent.---But I retort, why does the definition 
assume more than the argument can possibly bear out? 

How can the \textit{invariableness} of the future be answered for by the experience of 
any invariableness in the past? It is truly 
impossible that it should be so. Custom 
can only, at the most, lead us to \textit{expect} 
that the future would be similar to the 
past; but it never could so sufficiently answer for it, as to enable us to form a definition concerning its \textit{absolute} \textsc{invariableness} \textit{of phenomenon}. 

Indeed, in many cases there are \textit{single} 
exceptions to universal experience, and to 
any habit of expectation founded on it; 
which at once proves Mr. Hume's definition to be erroneous; for hence the \textit{invariableness} of the sequence becomes altered, and 
custom shown to be utterly incapable of affording a \textit{universal definition}, of the relation in question.---Now, \textit{experiment} is what 
decides as to a real and necessary cause, 
under given circumstances.---When an event 
happens under one set of circumstances, 
not under another in all respects the same, 
save \textsc{one}; \textit{that} one is a \textit{true cause}, and a 
\textit{necessary one}; and under the same circumstances, it must be invariably wanted to that end; and every mind feels it so, because it perceives that an \textit{alteration} could 
not begin of itself. This, and nothing but 
this, is a \textit{strict necessity}, and can enable the 
mind to predicate for the future as for the 
past. 

But the first definition is also faulty in 
another instance; because in every just 
definition, the ideas that are included 
in the terms, must not suit any other 
object. Now many objects are invariably 
antecedents and subsequents, that are not 
causes and effects; and it can be no good 
definition, to warrant the arguing in a circle, 
which \textit{this definition} evidently does. 

The second definition is also erroneous, 
because although similar causes must have 
similar effects, yet \textit{diverse} causes may 
produce the same effects also---therefore 
the \textit{second object might exist} without the 
first, by the operation of any other cause 
efficient to it.\footnote{I make this remark however, rather with respect to 
Mr. Hume's notion of cause than my own; in order to show there is an inconsistency between his argument and his definition; for \textit{diverse antecedents} might invariably be 
\textit{followed} by \textit{similar subsequents}; then, in each separate 
case the second object might exist without the first.} The third definition, viz. ``an object followed by another, and whose 
appearance always conveys the \textit{thought to that other},'' does not differ materially 
from the first---yet it is worthy of observation, that the thought always being carried 
by the appearance of one object to the idea 
of another, proves nothing but \textit{an accidental though strong association of ideas}; and 
is in like manner objectionable, on account 
of \textit{suiting other objects than the thing defined}. 
Every \textit{Andrew} is not necessarily ``\textit{Simon Peter's Brother},'' although my thought 
always recurs to that idea, upon every mention of the name of \textit{Andrew}.\footnote{[John 1:\thinspace40.]}

\subsection*{Section the Fourth}

It follows then from the definitions 
given in the preceding section, and the 
reasonings on which they are formed, that 
were a body, in all other respects resembling 
snow, to have the taste of salt and feeling of 
fire, it would be an extraordinary phenomenon, no doubt; and one which might for ought we know take place, but it would not 
be snow; and such a body could not fall from 
the clouds but by new causes efficient to 
its formation;---it would, therefore, be entirely a different object, and would require 
a new name; and the phenomenon could 
offer no ground for the conclusion, that 
\textit{reason} does not afford an argument, for the 
expectation of similar effects from similar 
causes.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.18.]}

Nature, it is true, varies all her operations; but not in a manner that can ever 
make it appear otherwise than a contradiction to reason, that it should be through 
interferences with her regular course. For 
instance, something similar to the case 
imagined does take place; we all know 
that various substances fall from the clouds; 
but they are all named by various names 
accordingly; they are known by reason to 
be different \textit{masses of qualities}, different objects, which must have been produced by 
different circumstances. Such variety, 
therefore, offers no contradiction to our \textsc{reason}, our \textsc{expectations}, or our \textsc{terms}. Yet Mr. Hume seems to think that nature, without a contradiction to our ideas, may be 
supposed to alter her course in the \textit{determination of her qualities}; and occasion contrary and different qualities, from otherwise 
similar objects. Nature, no doubt, preserving in many objects certain appearances to some of the senses, may vary the remaining qualities. 

But this cannot be, without her using 
prevening causes of an altered kind, efficient to the new production; and then it is 
a new object and must be \textit{newly named}. 
Such events as these, which are nothing 
else than all the various events, in the uni- 
verse, (for all things are \textit{alike} to some of 
the senses, and \textit{diverse} in others;) nature is full of; but this does not prove, 
there is not a \textit{necessary connection} between 
\textsc{cause and effect}; and that custom only 
guides our expectations. On the contrary, 
it is because there can be no ``\textit{beginnings} 
of \textit{existences}'' by themselves, that we know, 
when new phenomena arise, from \textit{apparently} 
similar circumstances, that we must lie under a mistake; and that the new objects 
cannot be \textit{the same objects altered}, and elicited from similar circumstances. We 
might as well deem meteoric stones to be 
snow, as a body, which had the taste of salt 
and the feeling of fire. Nature, therefore, 
cannot, when employing \textit{like} causes in action, alter her course in determining different and contrary ``\textit{effects}'' from otherwise 
similar objects; because in such a case, 
these \textit{new qualities} would absolutely be \textit{uncaused}; \textit{different} qualities would be exhibited from \textit{precisely similar conjunctions of 
bodies}, i.e. \textit{different} and \textit{contrary} qualities, 
(or effects) from otherwise similar objects, 
(or causes) which is impossible. 

Should it be said that nature is supposed to be employing different causes in 
action; by altering the ``\textit{secret powers}'' 
(whilst the ``\textit{sensible qualities}'' remain the 
same,) that it is in this way she changes 
her course---then the prevening \textit{conjunctions 
of bodies} which produced these secret 
powers, being supposed different; the \textit{natures} of the objects are different; they are 
truly \textit{other} objects, and there is no astonishment at the production of their altered effects; \textit{there is no alteration in the course 
of nature}; and the phenomena will not 
support Mr. Hume's argument \textit{against} \textsc{reason}, and in favor of \textsc{custom} only; it follows, therefore, that if ``we imagine the 
course of nature \textit{may change},'' it must be 
under the notion of a \textit{cause equivalent to it}:---\textit{in which case there is no contradiction offered 
to the notion of causation as founded on} \textsc{reason}. But for nature otherwise to change, and 
to vary either her ``\textit{effects}," or ``\textit{secret 
powers}" without varying the causes or prevening circumstances whose junction formed the objects, whence these result;---is so 
obviously impossible, that we cannot even 
suppose the will and power of the Deity 
to be able to work the contradiction. He 
could not make a finite quality, \textit{dependent} upon himself or some other cause 
for its exhibition, to become \textit{independent} 
and able to \textit{exist of itself}; he could not 
otherwise than by himself altering the determination of the causes that form the 
objects; then there is a cause for the alleged change---the objects are not \textit{similar} objects; the \textit{whole} prevening circumstances are not the same; and it is only 
\textit{unlike} causes again that beget \textit{unlike} effects; unlike objects that vary in their qualities. 

But the following sentence, which contains the passage alluded to, involves 
an ambiguity of expression, which ought 
to be noticed, lest it should appear as 
though I had mistaken it, and consequently my answer not appear sufficiently 
applicable, viz. ``Nature maybe supposed 
to change her course since it implies no 
contradiction, that an object \textsc{seemingly} 
like those which we have experienced, 
may be attended with different or contrary effects.''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.18.} There is here an ambiguity of sense on account of the expression ``\textsc{seemingly}''; for it may either intend, \textit{an 
alteration in the determination of effects 
from objects}, \textit{in} \textsc{all other} \textit{respects similar}, 
\textit{save in these} \textsc{contrary} \textit{effects}; or \textit{an} ``\textsc{arbitrary}'' \textit{change in the} ``secret powers'' ``\textit{which 
mix with the sensible qualities}; \textit{and on which 
the effects entirely depend}.'' In either sense, 
such an arbitrary change in the course of nature, is a ``\textsc{contradiction to reason}''
and an \textsc{impossibility}. 

Mr. Hume however seems to use it in 
either of these senses, as the occasion 
serves, and without conceiving there is 
much difference between them. 

The former sense however appears to 
be that in which it is used, as applicable in 
the instance concerning the changes upon 
snow. Compare these passages, ``may I not 
distinctly conceive, a body \textit{in all other respects} resembling snow having the taste 
of salt, and feeling of fire,''---with, 
``every effect is a distinct event from 
its cause''; and ``even after it is suggested, its conjunction must appear \textit{arbitrary} with its cause, since there are always many other effects, which to \textit{reason} might seem fully as consistent and natural.''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.18, 4.11.} But it is in the latter sense, viz.: in the ``\textit{arbitrary}'' alteration of the 
``\textit{secret powers},'' (\textit{in order to form} \textsc{different} \textit{causes for the determination of} \textsc{different} \textit{effects}), which must explain the following 
passage: ``Let the course of nature be 
allowed hitherto ever so regular proves 
not that for the future it will continue 
so.'' ``The secret nature of objects, 
and consequently all their effects and 
influences, may change without any 
change in the sensible qualities''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.21; the method in which this idea begs the question, has been taken notice of before.}; In 
either of the senses in which Mr. Hume 
uses the notion in question, it is equally 
absurd; for as \textit{cause} is not by him granted, 
nature must be supposed to change her 
regular march \textit{uncaused}; whether in striking 
off \textit{different} and \textit{contrary} qualities, from 
objects in \textit{every other} respect similar, \textit{save 
in these arbitrary and contrary determinations}; or in the mixing \textit{different secret 
powers} amidst the \textit{sensible qualities}. Nor 
will it answer for Mr. Hume to shift his 
position, and say; that the ``secret powers'' 
may be considered, as \textit{changed} by the \textit{regular operations of nature}; and that, on account of our inability to detect them, we are necessarily obliged to consider, the 
\textit{sensible qualities} \textsc{only}, as \textit{like causes}; 
thereby concluding the \textit{effects} will be \textit{similar} upon \textit{insufficient grounds}; and thus 
\textsc{reason}, not able to support the idea of a 
\textit{really} necessary connection between them. 

For upon this supposition, the \textit{real relation} of cause and effect, is \textit{assumed as 
granted}--- 

First. In order to account for the change in the secret powers. 

Secondly. To account for the change in the effects dependent upon them. 

And this is at once yielding the whole argument to the adversary!\footnote{This sort of argument forms a sophism which logicians term ``\textit{ignoratio elenchi}''; ``something being proved 
which is not necessarily inconsistent with the proposition maintained'': see Watts, \textit{Logick} (1725), Part 3, Chapter 3, Section 1. And this 
is the real gist, of the whole of Mr. Hume's argument (a 
\textit{posteriori}) and which is generally considered, I believe, as 
both acute and \textit{logical}.} Enabling him justly to retort, that he makes use of the general principle concerning cause and effect (which is now granted), and which he 
supports upon ``\textit{general reasoning},'' whereby in many instances to \textit{suspect}, and in 
many others to \textit{detect}, \textsc{un}like secret powers 
amidst the sensible qualities, by which 
means it becomes applicable, as an \textsc{axiom} 
founded on \textsc{reason}, wherewith to try every 
kind of experience both in philosophy and 
common life---whilst also he can maintain;---that unless it were for the knowledge of 
such a general principle, \textit{no knowledge} of 
the ``secret powers'' of nature in ever so 
many \textit{past} instances, could be of any material service to us \textit{for the future}. 

All mathematical demonstration is 
built upon the notion; that where quantities, or diagrams, resemble each other, 
the relations which are true, with respect 
to \textsc{one} of each kind will be true with 
respect to \textit{all} others of a \textit{like} kind; \textsc{only} 
\textit{because there is nothing else to make a 
difference among them}. So, if in all \textit{past 
time}, such \textit{secret powers} could be shown 
necessarily connected with such \textit{sensible 
qualities}; yet \textit{in future} it could not thence be proved to continue so, \textit{unless supported 
by the axioms};---\textit{that} \textsc{like} \textit{causes must} \textsc{exhibit} \textit{like} effects, and that \textsc{differences 
cannot arise} \textit{of themselves}. 

Upon the whole, therefore, Mr. Hume 
must be understood to mean, that as we 
know nothing of ``\textit{cause and effect},'' or of 
the ``\textit{secret processes of nature}'' so she might 
be supposed indifferently to strike off contrary effects from similar prevening causes, 
or else to alter their ``secret powers,'' whilst 
their \textsc{formation} was produced by the same 
means as usual. Thus that exactly the 
same circumstances might prevene the falling of snow, (precisely the same objects 
might unite to produce that object,) upon 
any two occasions, yet, it might have the 
taste of salt or feeling of fire! That the ``secret powers'' of vegetation might in future 
be altered; although the seasons should 
roll the same as before; and every power 
in nature be only equal to the contrary 
supposition! 

To all which I answer, nature cannot 
alter her course when she is employing \textit{similar means} in the formation of objects, by 
changing any of the ``secret powers,'' or 
altering any effects; because the prevening 
circumstances being supposed in any two 
cases similar, there would be no assignable reason for the difference. A difference, 
or change, \textit{either} in the ``\textit{secret powers}''
of objects, or the \textit{effects} of causes, (other 
things remaining the same) is exactly equal 
to the \textsc{creation} of so many new qualities, 
which could not, without a \textsc{contradiction}, 
\textit{arise of themselves}. 

I can conceive it said by some, although 
Mr. Hume would have no right to do so, 
that a miraculous interference might alter 
the course of nature; not so, not in determining the production of dissimilar objects 
from similar causes. No miracle could 
form an \textit{uncaused} change in nature (which 
is the notion in question). 

A miraculous interference, that is, an 
interference of God as a cause, might alter 
the production of objects, yet still there is a 
\textit{cause} equivalent to the \textit{change}, and again 
\textit{unlike} objects beget \textit{unlike} qualities: I therefore draw a conclusion from the whole 
of this reasoning, exactly contrary to Mr. 
Hume's inference from his; admitting indeed with him, that before experience we 
cannot know what \textit{particular} effects will 
flow from given causes; yet \textit{after experience} 
I judge that it is ``\textit{reason} which guides us in 
our expectations''; because it convinces 
us, that ``instances'' (of \textit{effects},) ``of which 
we have had no experience must resemble'' (when causes are similar) ``those of 
which we have had experience,'' for that 
``the course of nature must continue uniformly the same,'' \textit{by the regular determination of like cause and effect}.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} (1739), 1.3.6.4.]}

The same kind of answer will serve for 
other paradoxical questions which Mr. 
Hume puts in these Essays. 

Is there, says he, any more intelligible 
proposition than to affirm, that all the trees 
will flourish in December and January, and 
decay in May and June?\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.18.]} Certainly not, to 
those who conceive that the ``course of 
nature may without an implied contradiction alter the determination of effects that proceed from like causes,'' or, which is the 
same thing, exhibit different or contrary 
qualities, from similar objects. But according to the method I have laid down of 
viewing the operations of nature, there cannot be a more \textit{unintelligible proposition} than 
to assert of those trees, which have usually 
flourished in May and June, that they may 
cease to do so, and only thrive in December 
and January. 

So far from the mind being able distinctly ``\textit{to conceive}'' such a change in their 
qualities, when the proof has been once 
afforded, that it is their nature to require 
warmth for their growth; and that cold 
kills their blossoms; it must be ever after 
considered impossible for these objects to 
affect qualities not originally included in 
their \textit{natures};---or, for their \textit{natures} to 
alter, without a cause equivalent to the 
alteration---or a cause equivalent to it to be 
\textit{supposed}, without \textsc{reason} being the foundation of the whole principle of \textsc{causation}. 

To suppose that the circumstances which at first stamped them the objects they are, could enable them to preserve themselves 
similar objects, and yet arbitrarily put on 
wholly contrary qualities, seems to be about 
as reasonable as to assert that black may become white, and white become black, and yet 
each color merit its original name, of \textit{black} 
or \textit{white}; whilst, at the same time, these 
changes take place on account of such a 
``change in the course of nature,'' as determine that although all the causes in 
action are sufficient only to produce 
black, yet white shall appear; and \textit{vice 
versa}. Indeed, before ``\textit{nature could be 
conceived to alter her course}''; the question 
about which Mr. Hume is \textit{examining experience} (namely, whether she will support 
the knowledge of the necessary connection 
of like objects and their qualities,) must be 
supposed to be \textit{already} answered in the 
\textit{negative}; and that it is \textsc{known} \textit{that nature 
may be supposed} to exhibit \textit{similar} antecdents \textit{followed} by \textit{different} subsequents, or in other words that there is \textit{no necessary 
connection} between like objects and like 
qualities; which is begging the question; 
and in a different way from that in which 
he means to answer it, for he means to support the doctrine of necessary connection, though upon principles peculiarly his 
own. Should it be said that I assume the 
contrary position, I answer, I do not \textit{assume} 
it; but have previously proved the general 
conclusion, that ``all like causes must 
have like effects''; (because otherwise, \textit{objects would begin of themselves}:) in order 
purposely to show that ``nature cannot alter 
her course.'' Mr. Hume makes also a great 
mistake in supposing because we can conceive in the fancy the existence of objects 
contrary to our experience, that therefore 
they may really exist in nature; for it by 
no means follows that things which are 
incongruous in nature, may not be contemplated by the imagination, and received as 
possible until reason shows the contrary. 
Indeed, the fallacy, on which his whole 
sceptical doctrines are \textit{built}, may be seen 
at the very outset of his first Essay.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 4.1--2.]} He 
imagines it impossible to conceive the \textit{contrary} to any \textit{known relation} in quantities; 
but that we may \textit{conceive} the \textit{contrary of 
every matter of fact as possible}---impossible, 
under \textit{the same circumstances}, and if the 
\textit{circumstances alter}, the fact is a \textit{different fact}; but not a \textit{contrary one}---any more 
than the \textit{different} relations of various quantities are not \textit{contrary} to each other. Mr. 
Hume did not perceive that all objects 
whatever in relation to us, are but masses 
of certain qualities elicited from certain 
prevening circumstances, and therefore incapable of having different qualities, (or of 
showing diverse effects) whilst yet they 
remain similar objects \textit{born under like circumstances}. He did not perceive that the 
``\textit{productive principle},'' or \textit{the cause of an 
effect}, is to be found \textit{in the junction of objects already existing}, by which new objects are formed; but conceiving the nature of the operation of this principle 
to be wholly unknown, he imagined and 
alleged all things to be only ``\textit{conjoined}, 
and \textit{not connected}''; and that they might 
change their places fortuitously; custom 
only connecting them in the fancy; and a 
contrary fancy as capable of unconnecting 
them again. 

Strange philosophy! ``Effects may be 
supposed non-existent this minute, and 
existent the next''; (and so in suspense,) and may therefore ``begin their existence 
by themselves.''---If this be so, undoubtedly 
we want no causes for our effects; our 
rose-trees may suspend their blossoms in 
June; the flower require no warmth for its 
expansion, and remain non-existent till December! 

That different objects have different 
qualities, all are well acquainted with;---The Chinese rose, and the holly, can 
thrive in winter; but the same kind of 
rose, that hitherto has grown only in spring, 
and flourished in summer, can no more put 
forth its leaves and expand its blossoms in 
winter, than the mercury in a \textit{tried} thermometer can suddenly contract to the freezing point, in a burning summer's day. 

Let us however, before quitting this important and interesting argument, choose 
an example to prove, that ``nature cannot without a contradiction be imagined 
to alter her course.'' Let a receiver be imagined void of every substance whatever; 
and nothing but an \textit{uncolored space} within 
it. Now it is surely the ``course of nature,'' for this uncolored space to \textit{remain as it is}, 
without some \textit{cause steps in to alter it}; and 
if \textit{some cause steps in to alter it}, ``nature does 
\textit{not} alter her course.'' Then let nature be 
supposed to alter her course, and a \textit{scarlet 
color uncaused} to enter. Does not every 
reader perceive the impossibility that scarlet 
uncaused could enter? That it could ``start 
of itself into existence?'' Yet such is the 
idea that is veiled under Mr. Hume's argument; that different and contrary qualities 
can take place in similar circumstances; 
that a rose may blow in winter, when the 
causes were efficient to its blowing only in 
June! No circumstances are supposed 
changed; and yet ``\textit{of itself},'' the nature of 
the rose may change!---And so may a new 
phenomenon take place in an \textit{empty receiver}, 
as the entrance of a scarlet color, or of a 
dove, or any other imaginable being, without 
an equivalent change of circumstances for 
its introduction.

The sum of Mr. Hume's argument is, 
that we knowing nothing of the ``secrets of nature,'' we cannot know there is 
really a necessary connection between objects; but \textit{imagining} there is, this \textit{imagination} arises, from a \textsc{customary observation}, of \textit{the invariableness of their antecedence and subsequence}; which invariableness, however, does not prove, that each 
connection may be more than an \textit{insulated 
casual event}; not obligatory in nature; 
therefore \textit{other subsequent} events might, 
without a contradiction, be imagined to 
happen after \textit{similar antecedents}, and a \textit{different order of events} might be supposed in 
the ``course of nature.''

Now shortly the whole of this reasoning 
concerning \textit{the possibility of nature altering 
her course}, is but a circle! For the argument 
is invented to show that \textsc{custom} \textit{not} \textsc{reason}, must be the only ground of our belief in the relation of cause and effect.---But it is 
\textit{impossible to imagine such a change in nature}, 
unless \textit{reason} were previously excluded as 
the principle of that relation;---\textit{and it is impossible to exclude reason as the principle of 
that relation}, except by supposing \textit{that nature 
may alter her course}.---Thus the idea of causation, is founded only on experience\footnote{``The opinion that a cause is necessary to every new production arises from experience'' (Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature} [1739], 1.3.3.9).}, experience is supplied with arguments by \textit{custom} not by \textit{reason}\footnote{``All inferences from experience are effects \textit{of custom} not of \textit{reasoning}'' (Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 5.5).} and custom is supported 
in her authority by a supposed change in 
nature\footnote{``Since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, there can be no demonstrative arguments in the case''; ``Wherever there is a propensity without being impelled by any reasoning we say this propensity is the \textit{effect} of custom'' (Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 4.18, 5.5).}, \textit{impossible} to any idea of causation\footnote{``If \textit{there} were nothing to bind objects together the inferences from present facts would be entirely precarious'' (Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 4.4).}, \textit{unless} \textsc{already supposed to be merely the effect of custom}.\footnote{``Our belief in causation is the effect of custom" (Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 7.28).}

Nor must we conclude this branch of 
the subject, without observing the contradiction that lies in the very endeavor to 
persuade the world that custom is the true 
``\textsc{cause} \textit{of} \textsc{belief}'' in \textit{necessary connection}, when before assenting to such a doctrine it must give up all usual habits of thinking upon the subject, and believe upon Mr. Hume's reasoning, what it never before believed!---

Mr. Hume himself recapitulates his argument thus: 

``Every idea is copied from some preceding impression (idea being an effect \textit{derived} from impression as its cause). In all single instances of the operation of bodies there is nothing that produces, nor consequently can suggest the idea of necessary connection. But when many instances appear, we \textit{feel} a new impression, a customary connection in the thought, between one object and its usual attendant.''\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 7.30]. Compare the Treatise and Essays,---in both works 
\textit{impressions} are considered as absolutely necessary to 
\textit{cause} ideas---to create them;---to \textit{produce} them;---they are 
considered as the truly ``productive principle'' of ideas---\textit{Objects} without which they could not exist.} 

Now this method of placing the argument is but the statement of \textit{another 
circle}; for \textit{causation} is used as the very 
principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system; and afterwards we are 
desired to search for the \textit{impression}, which 
is the \textsc{cause} of that \textsc{effect}, viz. the \textit{idea 
causation}. 

And it is no answer to say that the 
notion of causation is spoken of in his own 
sense, not in his adversary's; for in either 
sense it is equally illogical, to prove the 
conclusion by the premises, and the premises by the conclusion. 

What should we think of an author, who, 
in attempting to account for the original 
discovery of metals, proved that it was 
effected by the use of instruments framed 
from a material termed \textit{iron}, drawn from the 
bowels of the earth? 

In like manner there is \textit{a want of logical 
precision} in referring all the principles 
which connect our ideas to three kinds of 
associations amongst them; of which \textit{causation} is ranked as one;---and then (in order 
to account for causation,) show the power 
that lies in the associations of ideas. Such 
a notion ends in the formation of a mere identical proposition; \textit{viz}. a certain association of ideas is causation; and causation 
consists in an association of ideas. 

But there is still another passage in 
Mr. Hume's Essays, of greater consequence than any I have quoted, or argued 
on; and which I shall yet detain the reader 
for a few moments in order to consider; 
it is this following: 

``As reason is incapable of any variation, the conclusions which it draws from one circle, are the same which it would form from surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man having seen one body move after being impelled by another would infer, that \textit{every body} will move after a like impulse.''\footnote{Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} [1748], 5.5.}

This passage I consider as containing 
the whole gist of Mr. Hume's error, and 
therefore it points out where my answer 
should meet it. The error consists, in making an \textit{incomplete comparison}, between 
the two subjects compared. \textit{Every body} 
is taken in an indefinite sense for every 
\textit{kind of body}; but \textit{circle} is not taken for 
every \textit{kind of figure}. The reason whence 
the \textsc{conclusions} concerning all circles are 
\textit{general}, is upon the very principle of cause 
and effect; for I know by experience, that 
upon the first study of mathematical 
science, I found much difficulty in a philosophical objection I could not easily 
answer; namely; that the relations of the 
quantities in one figure did not seem 
\textit{necessarily} applicable to \textit{all} of a like kind; 
until I perceived that the affections of \textit{all}, 
were \textsc{involved} in \textit{one} of \textit{each kind}; as 
there was nothing to occasion a \textit{difference} amidst their relations. Now then let 
the data be the same, and the \textsc{impulse} \textit{given} 
not only be \textit{like}, but the \textsc{body} \textit{given be like}; 
and I conceive that every man, and every 
child, would expect, upon a second trial, 
that the same body would move in the same 
manner as before. The inference would be 
drawn from the mind perceiving, (in the 
first instance,) that no motion would have 
taken place except from the conjunction of the body with the impulsive force; and in 
the second case would add to the memory 
of this effect, the reasoning, that there 
being nothing else to make a difference, a 
like effect would again take place. Nay, I 
am persuaded, that reason might go so far 
as, from calculating the proportions of the 
impulse used, and the body moved, to conclude the varieties, which would take place 
under proportionably different circumstances. 

Mr. Hume draws two inferences of much 
consequence from his doctrine; First, that 
as our \textit{custom of thinking} is not the \textit{operation 
of nature}, so we have no positive proof, that 
a cause is wanted for the existence of the 
universe as of a \textit{truly} ``\textit{productive principle}.'' Secondly, that it is \textit{unreasonable to believe in miracles}, because it is foolish to allow 
of our \textit{customary habits of thinking}, which 
arise from ``experience in the course of 
nature,'' to be interfered with by an ``experience of a less frequent occurrence'';
which dependence upon testimony can 
only afford. This latter inference he professes in his Essay against Miracles.\footnote{[Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748), 10.10--13].} The former opinion is less openly acknowledged; not being stated in explicit terms, 
but of immediate inference from the doctrine; and which he was well aware of, was 
the case. 

The sum of my answer and argument 
is, that although we know not the ``secrets of nature,'' yet we know that nothing can ``begin its own existence''; therefore there must truly be a ``productive 
principle,'' a cause necessary for every new 
existence in nature;---that we gain the 
knowledge of a ``necessary connection between cause and effect,'' by an \textit{experimentum crucis}, and therefore no greater 
number of invariable antecedents and consequents are wanted, than what is necessary, in order \textit{to observe} what circumstances \textit{affect} each other, or the contrary. 
That neither \textit{fancy} nor \textit{custom} creates 
the notion by an association of ideas; but 
the \textsc{understanding} gains it, by an observation of what is \textit{that circumstance, without 
which a new object does not exist}. Things therefore could not change their places, nor nature alter her course, without a contradiction. 

Hence it is that a cause is wanted 
in the universe equivalent to the change 
from non-existence to existence! And also 
that it is not more unreasonable to believe 
in miracles than in any other extraordinary 
phenomena in nature, when we may suppose, that \textit{efficient causes have been in action}, towards their production; and that 
\textit{final causes} are of \textit{sufficient weight to justify 
the altered work of providence!} 

But a minute investigation of Mr. Hume's 
Essay on Miracles is much wanted. The 
purport of it, and the method by which it is 
drawn out as a consequence from the three 
preceding Essays, has not (that I know 
of) been observed by the learned. One 
would think at first sight that Mr. Hume, 
in admitting that the ``course of nature 
might change,'' conceded much to the Christians. Instead of which he adroitly turns 
round upon them, and says, ``so it may in 
fact''; but in ``custom'' you \textit{think it cannot}, 
therefore it is absurd to allow this custom of thought to be overthrown by testimony. 
In this struggle of fancy, against fancy, the 
more powerful must and ought to prevail!---If these pages should find favor before the 
public, an examination of the Essay on 
Miracles is intended to follow them; without which the answer to these on cause 
and effect is hardly complete. 

Should an objection arise to my doctrine, that on account of supposing causes 
to act as the junctions of different qualities, and yet by pushing back all causes 
to the \textsc{One uncaused Essence}; I thereby 
prevent the idea of him being reposed in as 
a cause; as he forms \textsc{one} object only: I 
answer, that the uncaused essence, however 
mysterious in his nature, and however awful and distant to our speculations, must 
nevertheless have attributes; or in other 
words, its own peculiar qualities, which required no former beings, to \textit{give birth to 
them}. 

\textit{The unions of such qualities among 
themselves}, might well be equal to the 
going forth of the great creation! The union of \textit{wisdom}, with benevolence; and of 
these with the ``\textit{power}'' arising out of the 
inexhaustible resources of his essence, 
might well occasion the ``starting forth''
of innumerable beings; the highest orders 
of which, without the slightest philosophical contradiction, might be considered as 
coeval and coequal with the Father ``as 
touching the Godhead.''\footnote{[In the Chalcedonian Creed (451 CE), Jesus was declared to be ``consubstantial with the Father as touching the Godhead, and the same consubsantial with us as touching the manhood'' (William Berriman, \textit{A Historical Account of the Controversies That Have Been in the Church, Concerning the Doctrine of the Holy and Everblessed Trinity} [1725], 306).]}  But after this,
the wide universe, with all its gradations of 
wonderful beings, with all its powers of life 
and heat, and motion, must have come out 
from him according to the laws with which 
they were endowed. And although the 
original undivided essence, whose qualities 
were equal to such creation, must be considered as antecedent to his own work; yet 
the \textit{operation} of that essence must ever 
have been the same from all eternity; and 
in that point of view, the \textit{junction} of wisdom 
and benevolence, with whatever ``\textit{capacities}'' of that essence were efficient to their 
ends, must have been accompanied with 
their instant synchronous effects;---the 
\textit{formation of inferior beings}. ``Let there 
be light,'' said God, ``and there was light.''\footnote{[Genesis 1:\thinspace3.]}

Thus God, the universal Father, and 
with him any noble \textit{manifestations} of his 
essence; then archangel, and angel; man 
(or beings analogous to him) and animals; 
mind, and matter; may be considered as 
having existed eternally, coming forth from 
him, living in him, and supported by him; 
whilst an analogous state of being must be 
expected to continue eternally, in like manner and it may also be expected as a circumstance consistent and probable with 
the whole of so grand an arrangement, that 
some inferior orders of beings may be raised 
in the scale of nature, to be inhabitants of 
a kindlier world than this; with enlarged 
capacities for happiness and virtue. 

The consideration of the method the 
understanding has recourse to, in order to 
judge of the probable presence of similar 
causes on the contrary, will come under our 
view in the next chapter. 

\end{document}  