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\title{Of Miracles\footnote{This is Section 10 of Hume's \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748); original text from \href{http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9662/pg9662.txt}{Project Gutenburg}; modernized text and a few additional notes by \href{http://www.trevorpearce.com/}{Trevor Pearce}.}}
\author{David Hume}
\date{1748}						% Activate to display a given date or no date

\begin{document}

\maketitle

\subsubsection*{Part 1}

\marginnote{\smaller10.1}[0cm]There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the \textit{real
presence}, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument
can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a
serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned
prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is
founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses
to those miracles of our Savior, by which he proved his divine mission.
Our evidence, then, for the truth of the \textit{Christian} religion is less
than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the
first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it
must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can anyone
rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of
his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and
therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly
revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just
reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both
the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry
not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as
external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by
the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

\marginnote{\smaller10.2}[0cm]Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which
must at least \textit{silence} the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and
free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I
have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with
the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of
superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the
world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and
prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.

\marginnote{\smaller10.3}[0cm]Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters
of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether
infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in
our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in
one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but
it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself
mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have
no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us
beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we
may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like
certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all
countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together:
Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint
our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact,
there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest
certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

\marginnote{\smaller10.4}[0cm]A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such
conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the
event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience
as a full \textit{proof} of the future existence of that event. In other
cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite
experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number
of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and
when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we
properly call \textit{probability}. All probability, then, supposes an
opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found
to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,
proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on
one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any
event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is
contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In
all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are
opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to
know the exact force of the superior evidence.

\marginnote{\smaller10.5}[0cm]To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe,
that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even
necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony
of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of
reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause
and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to
observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from
no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human
testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of
witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any
discoverable connection together, and that all the inferences, which we
can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of
their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not
to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony, whose
connection with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any
other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men
commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they
not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I
say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature,
we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man
delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of
authority with us.

\marginnote{\smaller10.6}[0cm]And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is
founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is
regarded either as a \textit{proof} or a \textit{probability}, according as the
conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object
has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of
circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this
kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes,
that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and
observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side,
it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and
with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every
other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of
others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or
uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline
to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the
force of its antagonist.

\marginnote{\smaller10.7}[0cm]This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived
from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary
testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the
manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all
these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of
fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few,
or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they
affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the
contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other
particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of
any argument, derived from human testimony.

\marginnote{\smaller10.8}[0cm]Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavors to
establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous; in that
case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a
diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians,
is not derived from any \textit{connection}, which we perceive \textit{a priori},
between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a
conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has
seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite
experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force
goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which
remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain
degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in
this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they
endeavor to establish; from which contradition there necessarily arises
a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

\marginnote{\smaller10.9}[0cm]\textit{I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato}, was a
proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot.\footnote{Plutarch, \textit{The Life of Cato the Younger}, 19.4.} The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority.\\

\marginnote{\smaller10.10}[0cm]The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning
the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very
strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state
of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little
analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform
experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were
not conformable to it.\footnote{No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water
    did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a
    situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to
    tell \textit{a priori} what will result from it. It is making a new
    experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One
    may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but
    still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that,
    in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to
    the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would
    not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not
    gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it
    comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from
    the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event,
    therefore, may be denominated \textit{extraordinary}, and requires a
    pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a
    warm climate: But still it is not \textit{miraculous}, nor contrary to
    uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all
    the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra
    have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the
    freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they
    never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore
    they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the
    consequence.}

\marginnote{\smaller10.11}[0cm]But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of
witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of
being only marvelous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the
testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in
that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must
prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that
of its antagonist.

\marginnote{\smaller10.12}[0cm]A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable,
that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in
the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and
there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a
miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever
happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man,
seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of
death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently
observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to
life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There
must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event,
otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform
experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full \textit{proof},
from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor
can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by
an opposite proof, which is superior.\footnote{Sometimes an event may not, \textit{in itself}, seem to be
    contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it
    might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a
    miracle; because, in \textit{fact}, it is contrary to these laws. Thus
    if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick
    person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the
    clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order
    many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command;
    these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are
    really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if
    any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by
    accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws
    of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a
    miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can
    be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a
    man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately
    defined, \textit{a transgression of a law of nature by a particular
    volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some
    invisible agent}. A miracle may either be discoverable by men
    or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of
    a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising
    of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force
    requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so
    sensible with regard to us.}

\marginnote{\smaller10.13}[0cm]The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our
attention), ``That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,
unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more
miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish; and even in
that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior
only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which
remains, after deducting the inferior.'' When anyone tells me, that he
saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself,
whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or
be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have
happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to
the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always
reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be
more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till
then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

\subsubsection*{Part 2}

\marginnote{\smaller10.14}[0cm]In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony,
upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof,
and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it
is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our
concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on
so full an evidence.

\marginnote{\smaller10.15}[0cm]For \textit{first}, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle
attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense,
education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in
themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all
suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation
in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their
being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts
performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the
world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances
are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.

\marginnote{\smaller10.16}[0cm]\textit{Secondly}. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if
strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance,
which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The
maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is,
that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of
which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most
probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought
to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of
past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily
reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree;
yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule;
but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather
the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very
circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of
\textit{surprise} and \textit{wonder}, arising from miracles, being an agreeable
emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events,
from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who
cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous
events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the
satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight
in exciting the admiration of others.

\marginnote{\smaller10.17}[0cm]With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received,
their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of
wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the
spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of
common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all
pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and
imagine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be
false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world,
for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion
has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on
him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other
circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not
have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his
evidence: what judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these
sublime and mysterious subjects: or if they were ever so willing to
employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of
its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence: and his
impudence overpowers their credulity.

\marginnote{\smaller10.18}[0cm]Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or
reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the
affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their
understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully
or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian
audience, every \textit{Capuchin}, every itinerant or stationary teacher can
perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by
touching such gross and vulgar passions.

\marginnote{\smaller10.19}[0cm]The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural
events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary
evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove
sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and
the marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all
relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with
regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There
is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly,
especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning
marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see
each other twice, but the whole neighborhood immediately join them
together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of
propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the
intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives
attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater
evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline
the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest
vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?

\marginnote{\smaller10.20}[0cm]\textit{Thirdly}. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural
and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among
ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given
admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received
them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with
that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received
opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt
to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole
frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations
in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles,
revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those
natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgements, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled
with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as
we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is
nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds
from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous, and that,
though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and
learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

\marginnote{\smaller10.21}[0cm]\textit{It is strange}, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of
these wonderful historians, \textit{that such prodigious events never happen
in our days}. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in
all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty.
You have yourself heard many such marvelous relations started, which,
being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last
been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies,
which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from
like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last
into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.

\marginnote{\smaller10.22}[0cm]It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though now
forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures
in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely
ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion.\footnote{[Lucian, \textit{Alexander the False Prophet}.]}
People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all
worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The
stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are
industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are
contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing
themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly
refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed,
from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even
among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and
distinction in Rome: nay, could engage the attention of that sage
emperor Marcus Aurelius; so far as to make him trust the success of a
military expedition to his delusive prophecies.

\marginnote{\smaller10.23}[0cm]The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant
people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on
the generality of them (\textit{which, though seldom, is sometimes the case})
it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if
the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and
knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry
the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence,
or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the
delusion. Men's inclination to the marvelous has full opportunity to
display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the
place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand
miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the
philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread,
throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which,
being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of
reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is
true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity
of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does
not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to
expose and detect his impostures.

\marginnote{\smaller10.24}[0cm]I may add as a \textit{fourth} reason, which diminishes the authority of
prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not
been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of
witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of
testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better
understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is
different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of
ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be
established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended
to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound
in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system
to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more
indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival
system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that
system was established; so that all the prodigies of different
religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of
these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other.
According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of
Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a
few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the
authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the
authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have
related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to
regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that
Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the
same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument
may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different
from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two
witnesses, maintaining a crime against anyone, is destroyed by the
testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues
distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been
committed.

\marginnote{\smaller10.25}[0cm]One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that
which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria,
by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot;
in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to
have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may
be seen in that fine historian; where every circumstance seems to add
weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the
force of argument and eloquence, if anyone were now concerned to
enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The
gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through
the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his
friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of
divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a
contemporary writer, noted for candor and veracity, and withal, the
greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so
free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the
contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose
authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgement
and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and
confirming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of
the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie.
``Both facts are told by eye-witnesses even now when falsehood brings no reward.''\footnote{Tacitus, \textit{Histories}, 4.81 [originally quoted in Latin]. Suetonius gives nearly the same account in \textit{The Life of Vespasian}, 7.2.} To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as
related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger
for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.

\marginnote{\smaller10.26}[0cm]There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may
well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled
into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through
Saragossa, the capital of Arragon, where he was shown, in the cathedral,
a man, who had served seven years as a door-keeper, and was well known
to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church.
He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that
limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures
us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the
canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for
a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous
devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle.\footnote{[\textit{Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz} (Amsterdam, 1717), 4:335--336.]} Here the relater was
also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and
libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so
\textit{singular} a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the
witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the
fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the
force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is,
that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any
credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in
the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in
order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove
the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances
of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was
commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place;
so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present,
by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great
part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such
an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a
miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject
of derision than of argument.

\marginnote{\smaller10.27}[0cm]There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one
person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in
France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose
sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving
hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of
as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more
extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the
spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of
credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent
theater that is now in the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them
was published and dispersed every where; nor were the \textit{Jesuits}, though
a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined
enemies to those opinions, in whose favor the miracles were said to
have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them.\footnote{[\textit{La verité des miracles operés par l'intercession de M. de Paris} (Utrecht, 1737).] This book was writ by Mons. Montgeron, counsellor or judge
    of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character, who
    was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere
    in a dungeon on account of his book.

    There is another book in three volumes (called [\textit{Recueil des miracles operés au tombeau de M. Paris} (Utrecht, 1733--36)]) giving an account of many of these
    miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are
    very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of
    these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our
    Savior and those of the Abbé; wherein it is asserted, that the
    evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if
    the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that
    of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers.
    If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human
    testimony, the French author is very moderate in his
    comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason,
    pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other in
    evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn
    from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book.

    Many of the miracles of Abbé Paris were proved immediately by
    witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at Paris,
    under the eye of Cardinal Noailles, whose character for
    integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies.

    His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the
    Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the
    court. Yet 22 rectors or curés of Paris, with infinite
    earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they
    assert to be known to the whole world, and indisputably
    certain: But he wisely forbore.

    The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one
    instance, that of Mademoiselle le Franc. But, besides that
    their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in
    the world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist
    witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they
    soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses,
    one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of
    credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle.
    This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the
    parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to
    meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men
    are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human
    testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest
    absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the
    affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the
    testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a
    miserable imposture, indeed, that does not prevail in
    that contest.

    All who have been in France about that time have heard of the
    reputation of Mons. Heraut, the \textit{lieutenant de Police}, whose
    vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence
    have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of
    his office is almost absolute, was vested with full powers, on
    purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he
    frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and
    subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory
    against them.

    In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De Sylva
    to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician
    declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as
    was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible she could,
    in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found
    her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but
    the opposite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and
    that his evidence was the very best proof of it.

    The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the
    absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle.
    They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by
    witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the
    resource of the Jews of old.

    No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation
    of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's
    edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these
    extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb,
    no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown
    down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces
    and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did
    not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho,
    on the sounding of the rams horns, nor break up the prison of
    every apostle, like that of St. Paul.

    No less a man, than the Duc de Chatillon, a duke and peer of
    France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a
    miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived
    several years in his house with a visible and palpable
    infirmity. I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are
    more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the
    secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or curés of
    Paris, who bear testimony to these impostures. The learning,
    genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the
    nuns of Port-Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe.
    Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece
    of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as
    extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives
    an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port-Royal,
    and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of
    nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of
    undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters,
    particularly the bishop of Tournay, thought this miracle so
    certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and
    free-thinkers. The queen-regent of France, who was extremely
    prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent her own physician to
    examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In
    short, the supernatural cure was so incontestable, that it
    saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with
    which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it
    had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful
    antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers.
    Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such
    despicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have
    reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have
    not mentioned! How often would the great names of Pascal,
    Racine, Arnaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? But if they
    be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more
    worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of the collection.
    Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that
    miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy
    prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown,
    which, etc.} Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the
corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of
witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the
events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all
reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.

\marginnote{\smaller10.28}[0cm]Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost
force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of
Philippi or Pharsalia for instance; that therefore all kinds of
testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose
that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the
victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had
uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind,
at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The
contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus
or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish
historian.

\marginnote{\smaller10.29}[0cm]The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favors the
passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family,
or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations
and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a
missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not
encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a
character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man
has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the
delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of
so holy and meritorious a cause?

\marginnote{\smaller10.30}[0cm]The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the
materials are always prepared for it. The ``kind eager for an audience,''\footnote{Lucretius, \textit{On the Nature of Things}, 4.594 [originally quoted in Latin].}
the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever
soothes superstition, and promotes wonder.

\marginnote{\smaller10.31}[0cm]How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and
exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a
time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such
reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is
obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and
observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles
of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to
so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most
established laws of nature?

\marginnote{\smaller10.32}[0cm]I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any
private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to
happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance.
Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and
judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to
distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But
the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of
altercations and debate and flying rumors; especially when men's
passions have taken part on either side.

\marginnote{\smaller10.33}[0cm]In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem
the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And
when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to
undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records
and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished
beyond recovery.

\marginnote{\smaller10.34}[0cm]No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the
very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always
sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall
under the comprehension of the vulgar.

\marginnote{\smaller10.35}[0cm]Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of
miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and
that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by
another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would
endeavor to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to
human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the
laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are
contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other,
and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that
assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the
principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular
religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may
establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as
to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system
of religion.

\marginnote{\smaller10.36}[0cm]I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a
miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of
religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or
violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of
proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to
find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors,
in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600, there was
a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the
tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among
the people: that all travelers, who return from foreign countries,
bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or
contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of
doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search
for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many
analogies, that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards
that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that
testimony be very extensive and uniform.

\marginnote{\smaller10.37}[0cm]But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree,
that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both
before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole
court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was
acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being
interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed
England for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at
the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the
least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt
of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that
followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it
neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me
the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an
affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that
renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap
from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still
reply, that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that
I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from
their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws
of nature.

\marginnote{\smaller10.38}[0cm]But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men,
in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that
kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and
sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the
fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being
to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does
not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is
impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being,
otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in
the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation,
and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the
testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by
miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable.
As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning
religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact;
this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and
make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it,
with whatever specious pretense it may be covered.

\marginnote{\smaller10.39}[0cm]Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. ``We
ought,'' says he, ``to make a collection or particular history of all
monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of every
thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with
the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every
relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree
upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, every thing
that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy, or such
authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for
falsehood and fable.''\footnote{Bacon, \textit{The New Organon}, Book 2, Aphorism 29.}

\marginnote{\smaller10.40}[0cm]I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here
delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends
or disguised enemies to the \textit{Christian Religion}, who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is
founded on \textit{Faith}, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing
it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To
make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in
scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine
ourselves to such as we find in the \textit{Pentateuch}, which we shall
examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not
as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere
human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book,
presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age
when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after
the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and
resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its
origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and
miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human
nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state:
Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction
of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the
favorites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of
their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing
imaginable: I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a
serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of
such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary
and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however,
necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of
probability above established.

\marginnote{\smaller10.41}[0cm]What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any
variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles,
and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did
not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it
would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine
mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may
conclude, that the \textit{Christian Religion} not only was at first attended
with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable
person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its
veracity: And whoever is moved by \textit{Faith} to assent to it, is conscious
of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the
principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to
believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

\end{document}  